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1. Executive Summary 
The Illawarra Business Chamber (Illawarra First) commissioned the SMART Infrastructure Facility 
UOW (SMART) to investigate options to improve the speed and reliability of passenger and freight 
rail transport services between the Illawarra and Sydney (Terms of Reference at Appendix A). 
The Illawarra region, despite its geographic proximity to Australia’s largest city, has historically 
suffered from relatively higher unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, in part due to 
poor transport connectivity to Sydney and a lack of industrial diversification.  Traditionally a large 
employer of mining, mining services, steelmaking and port services, the Illawarra economy has 
often struggled to maintain healthy growth and low unemployment during mining downturns.  
Improving rail transport connectivity to Sydney can assist in providing labour market 
diversification and improve workforce participation.   
The potential economic and social benefits of better connecting the Illawarra to Western Sydney in 
particular have been highlighted in several recent studies, including the Greater Sydney 
Commission in its Draft South West District Plan (2016).  The Commission cited the objectives 
established by Transport for NSW in relation to improving north-south transport connectivity in 
south western Sydney, including: “improved public transport and freight connectivity to Port 
Kembla and the Illawarra” (p.50).  A 2014 report by PwC for the Illawarra Business Chamber 
found that: “Accessing jobs and trading opportunities in Sydney already costs Illawarra residents 
and businesses around half a billion dollars a year.  Without action, the time and out of pocket 
costs are expected to increase to at least $690 million per annum by 2031” (p.iii).   
The significant population and economic growth forecasts for Western Sydney will be further 
supported by the decision to build Sydney’s second airport at Badgerys Creek.  In summary, the 
arguments to better connect the Illawarra to Sydney via the south west are strong and, in our view, 
will become stronger over the next two decades.   
Australian public policy has in recent years moved towards a focus on regional development as we 
wrestle with the high costs of addressing major liveability issues in our large cities such as traffic 
congestion, pollution, the availability of public space and housing affordability pressures.  This 
focus has also been driven by a sharp slowdown in regional growth following the end of the mining 
boom in 2012.   
A sensible lower cost approach to regional development would be to first develop Australia’s 
satellite regions that are immediately proximate to Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.  Such regions 
include the Illawarra, Ballarat and the Sunshine Coast.  For example, in the 1990s the Pacific 
Highway between Brisbane and the Gold Coast was significantly upgraded and the Brisbane rail 
network now extends into the heart of the Gold Coast.  As a result, there is practically no difference 
in the respective unemployment rates, and thousands of commuters travel between the two cities 
each day for work, study or leisure.  Similarly, better transport connectivity between the Illawarra 
and Sydney (particularly Western Sydney) has the potential to open up jobs, education, housing and 
leisure opportunities for the over two million residents of the Illawarra and Western Sydney.   
  








The main rail line between the Illawarra and Sydney is the South Coast Line.  The South Coast Line 
runs from Bomaderry (Nowra) to Waterfall station at the southern edge of the Sydney Trains 
Network.  The South Coast Line continues through to Central station and terminates at Bondi 
Junction.   
According to the current Sydney Trains timetable, it takes 87 minutes to travel the 82 km line 
(ie 56km/h average speed) between Wollongong and Central station in Sydney during the weekday 
morning peak.  To reach Parramatta station at the geographic centre of Sydney, the journey from 
Wollongong (via Redfern) takes a further 27 minutes at best.  On average, the total commute times 
between Wollongong and stations in south west Sydney, such as Liverpool (125 minutes), 
Leppington (130 minutes) and Campbelltown (131 minutes), are all over two hours.  Many rail 
commuters find it more convenient to opt for an extreme form of ‘park and ride’, driving the 
roughly 40 kms along the M1 (Princes Motorway) and parking at Waterfall, Heathcote or 
Sutherland stations before utilising the Sydney Trains Network. 
This lengthy commute for workers, students and day-trippers reduces economic and social 
opportunities for both Illawarra and Sydney residents in terms of accessing a wider range of jobs, 
business, trade, education, leisure and housing choices.   
The South Coast Line is shared between passenger and freight services, with significant freight 
movement between Port Kembla and Sydney (up to 23 slots per day).  Thermal coal is transported 
by rail to Port Kembla (for export) from the coalfields in the Sydney Basin and imported container 
freight is sent from Port Kembla into Sydney.  It has been previously estimated that the South Coast 
line will hit capacity in the mid-to late-2020s (ACIL Tasman, 2011).   
THE OPTIONS 
SMART was tasked with first examining whether it was possible to improve the efficiency of the 
South Coast Line and at what cost.   
In theory, rail commute times can be reduced by: (i) shortening the distance travelled (via line 
straightening, reducing steep gradients, and tunnelling), (ii) increasing train speeds safely (which 
often requires line straightening and/or investment in new signalling technology), or (iii) investing 
in line duplication to reduce bottlenecks and congestion.  Often, a combination of these measures is 
required to make a significant difference to commuting times.   
SMART found that reducing passenger commute times on the South Coast Line is severely 
challenged by the geological conditions of the Illawarra escarpment and the consequent engineering 
challenges, such as in relation to tunnelling.  SMART’s high-level cost benefit analysis indicates 
that, in order to achieve a significant reduction in commute times between Wollongong and Central 
stations, an investment in the order of $2 billion is required.  This high cost is driven by the fact that 
the South Coast Line is built on the Illawarra escarpment and significant line straightening by way 
of tunnelling is necessary to improve commute times.  Previous work on infrastructure cost drivers 
by SMART indicates that tunnelling costs would be in the order of $150 million per kilometre.  In 
other words, up to 13 kms of tunnelling could cost up to $2 billion.   
Given the likely costs and operational impact of investing in, and completing significant 
improvement to deliver greater efficiency on the South Coast Line, SMART investigated the 
potential for an additional passenger and freight line between the Illawarra and Sydney, by 
completing the 35 km Maldon-Dombarton line (referred to in this report as the South West 







Illawarra Rail Link (SWIRL)), which was partially built in the mid-1980s.  The rail link would 
connect the Main South Line (at Maldon) and the Moss Vale-Unanderra dedicated freight line at 
Dombarton.  The 7 km rail link from Dombarton along the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line to the 
junction of the South Coast Line would require electrification.  In sum, the SWIRL would 
comprise: 
- completion of the original 35 km Maldon-Dombarton rail line; 
- making the line a dual passenger/freight track (except for the two main bridges and the 4km  
tunnel) with electrification; and 
- electrifying the 7 km section of the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line. 
Our central estimate for the total cost of constructing the SWIRL as specified above is 
$1,689 million in 2016-17 dollars.   
In SMART’s view, the SWIRL could meet the transport connectivity objectives set by TfNSW at a 
lower cost and provide many economic and social benefits for residents of the Illawarra and 
Western Sydney.  For instance, the SWIRL and the South Coast Line operating together would 
increase total passenger and freight rail network capacity and open up jobs, business, trade, 
education, leisure and housing opportunities for both regions.  A new line would also reduce the 
cost of congestion, short-term closures (for upgrades) or a catastrophic geological failure on the 
South Coast Line.  Shutting the South Coast Line in the event of a significant rock fall/landslide on 
the Illawarra escarpment would severely disrupt the region’s economy, preventing coal exports and 
container imports as well as forcing rail commuters onto already congested roads in peak times.  
The availability of a second passenger and freight line between Sydney and the Illawarra would 
greatly reduce these costs.   
Finally, the ‘two-lines’ option could reduce the Illawarra’s traditionally higher average rate of 
unemployment by better connecting the region to Australia’s largest and deepest labour market.  By 
way of example, the difference between the long-term average rates of unemployment (over the 
period 1998-2016) between the much better connected Brisbane (5.6%) and Gold Coast (5.9%) 
regions is 0.3%, whereas the difference between Greater Sydney (4.9%) and the Illawarra (7.1%) is 
2.2%.   
The following schematic illustrates the main findings of our study.   
















There are substantial net economic benefits that could accrue, in particular to the Illawarra and 
south west Sydney regions, from completing the $1.7 billion SWIRL.  We have estimated a benefit-
cost ratio (BCR) for a passenger-freight SWIRL to be between 1.02 and 1.24, with our central 
estimate at the standard 7% discount rate over 50 years being 1.13.  At a 4% discount rate over 50 
years, which is the standard lower-bound estimate but in our view a more appropriate measure in 
the post-GFC world, our BCR central estimate is 1.56. 
It is important to note that whilst we recommend a discount rate of 4%, a standard rate of 7% is 
typically applied by Infrastructure Australia and Infrastructure NSW. This is further outlined in 
Appendix E. 
SMART has also estimated the economic impact on the Illawarra region of completing the SWIRL.  
Our detailed economic modelling identifies the benefit to the Illawarra region would be $2.6 billion 
(in NPV terms at the standard 7%) and over 1,100 permanent additional jobs (in FTE terms).  This 
indicates the return to the Illawarra would be $1.84 for each $1 invested in the SWIRL.   
There are many potential benefits deriving from the completion of the SWIRL, including:  
- Improved transport connectivity to the industrial heartland of south west Sydney, including 
the proposed Sydney second airport at Badgerys Creek.  The SWIRL would provide a faster 
route for rail commuters to stations in western and south west Sydney such as Liverpool, 
Leppington and Campbelltown. 
- Provision of infrastructure to accommodate potential increases in coal and other freight 
moving between Port Kembla and Sydney, and the Lithgow coalfields and Port Kembla (thus 
largely bypassing the Sydney Trains Network). 
- Augmentation of the capacity of Port Botany by bringing more freight through Port Kembla.   
- Reduced passenger and freight congestion on the South Coast Line by providing an 
alternative entry point into the Sydney Trains Network. 
- Improved transport connectivity between the Illawarra, Sydney’s second airport at Badgerys 
Creek and the Moorebank intermodal terminal. 
- Capacity to reduce heavy truck traffic congestion on Mt Ousley and other roads near Port 
Kembla (by taking some freight off trucks). 
- Additional incentive for investment in the Illawarra to counter the impacts of the mining 
downturn and loss of the steelmaking industry. 
- Indirect benefits such as reduced noise and pollution in urban areas in Wollongong and 
southern Sydney.   
- Essential infrastructure to minimise costs of a major upgrade or disruption to the South Coast 
Line, for instance as a result of landslides or rock falls, by providing an alternative route into 
Sydney. 
Completing the SWIRL to better connect the Illawarra with Sydney (and in particular south west 
Sydney) aligns with the Strategic Priorities of Infrastructure Australia and the Australian 
Government’s National Infrastructure Plan.   
 







For instance, Infrastructure Australia seeks to identify projects that: 
- Expand Australia’s productive capacity (SP1) 
- Increase Australia’s productivity (SP2) 
- Diversify Australia’s economic capabilities (SP3) 
The addition of the SWIRL to the existing South Coast Line will significantly enhance the freight 
capacity through Port Kembla.  Directing thermal coal exports from the coalfields in the Sydney 
Basin to Port Kembla via the more efficient SWIRL will increase productivity, as found by ACIL 
Tasman (2011).  Further to this, improving passenger and freight rail connectivity between the 
Illawarra and Western Sydney will diversify Australia’s economic capabilities by enhancing jobs, 
education, business, trade and leisure opportunities.   
The Australian Government, in its 2017-18 Budget, has made a clear commitment to regional 
economic development with, for example: 
- $5.3 billion in a new Commonwealth-owned company, WSA Co., to develop Western Sydney 
Airport with works planned to commence in 2018 and generate around 20,000 direct and 
indirect jobs in Western Sydney by the early 2030s; 
- An additional $8.4 billion equity investment in the Australian Rail Track Corporation to 
deliver Melbourne to Brisbane Inland Rail; 
- A $10 billion National Rail Program to fund priority regional and urban rail investments, with 
funding to be provided over 10 years.  The Australian Government “stands willing to deliver 
ready and proven rail projects across the nation that better connect our cities and grow the 
economy.  The Budget will also contribute $20 million to the development of up to three 
business cases for infrastructure projects that will deliver faster rail connections between 
major cities and major regional centres” (BP1, p.1-11); and 
- Committing more than $533 million in new funding to infrastructure and community projects 
to improve the “resilience, connectedness and adaptability of our regions, including a $472 
million Regional Growth Fund”, (Australian Government 2017-18 Budget Papers, BP1, p.3-
11). 
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
With the above in mind, SMART recommends that: 
- The NSW Government should make a submission under the National Regional Partnership 
Program to secure funding to develop a detailed business case for the construction of the 
SWIRL and the upgrade of the South Coast Line. 
- Infrastructure Australia and the Australian Government prioritise their consideration of the 
SWIRL given the significant potential economic benefits on offer and relatively lower cost 
against alternative options to improve rail transport connectivity in the Illawarra.   
- In addition to constructing the SWIRL, TfNSW, Infrastructure Australia and the Australian 
Government consider (and makes financial allocation for) further cost-effective incremental 
infrastructure improvements to the South Coast Line.   
- TfNSW fast track the rollout of the ETCS2 onto the Sydney Trains Network, which should 
improve the efficiency, safety and reliability of the South Coast Line.   








Illawarra First has commissioned the SMART Infrastructure Facility to investigate options to 
improve the speed and reliability of passenger and freight rail transport services between the 
Illawarra and Sydney (Terms of Reference at Appendix A).   
2.1 ABOUT THIS STUDY 
SMART has undertaken this study in five phases.   
In the first phase, we gathered expert opinion by hosting a stakeholder’s workshop on 
2 February 2017, which was well attended by NSW government and industry representatives.  We 
also undertook follow up meetings with TfNSW and NSW Ports as well as a number of individuals 
(Appendix C).   
In the second phase, we considered options to improve speed and reliability on the South Coast 
Line.  We analysed the current Sydney Trains timetable and used our in-house model RailNet 
(Appendix B) to try to better optimise passenger and freight rail transport between the Illawarra and 
Sydney.   
In the third phase of the study we undertook a cost benefit appraisal (CBA) of additional 
investments to improve the efficiency of the South Coast Line.   
In phase four, we undertook a high-level CBA of constructing the South West Illawarra Rail Link 
(SWIRL) as both a passenger and freight line, which incorporates the partly completed Maldon-
Dombarton line.   
Finally, in phase five, we undertook an economic impact analysis of the SWIRL to understand the 
impacts of the project on regional growth and jobs.  For this analysis we applied a best-practice 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Illawarra and Sydney economies in order to 
understand the impact of the additional capital expenditure as well as an expansion in the rail 
network and labour supply.   
2.2 A NOTE ON ECONOMIC EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
Economic performance can be measured in many ways and there is no one measure that captures all 
of the factors affecting the wellbeing of individuals, households, businesses or communities.  One 
common indicator of economic performance is GDP, which measures the production or income or 
spending generated in a country (or region) in a given year.  Other economic measures include 
employment growth, the unemployment (or underemployment) rate, the price level, private and 
public investment, wages growth, agricultural or industrial production and so on.  Social measures 
of performance might include rates of homelessness, suicide, hospital admission rates or waiting 
times, domestic violence, community and sports participation, educational attainment and so on.  
Generally, GDP (and particularly GDP per capita) is considered the best approximation for 
individual and community wellbeing (or ‘living standards’) because it is positively correlated to 
most other economic and social indicators.   
Cost benefit appraisal (CBA) is considered the foremost economic project evaluation technique, 
particularly for publicly funded infrastructure projects.  Done well, CBA is rigorous, objective, 
comparable and transparent.  CBA attempts to quantify in a comparable framework all of the 
private and community costs and benefits associated with a project.  Annual estimates of benefits 
and costs are discounted using a commonly accepted social discount rate to a common year.  In this 







way, the net benefits of projects (in dollar terms) planned across different time periods can be 
compared.  Benefit cost ratios can also be reliably compared.   
Measuring economic performance and evaluating infrastructure projects are two different things.  
The economic performance lens is broad, generally at the national, state or regional level.  The 
project evaluation lens is narrow, generally at the local level. 
A weakness of CBA, however, is that the evaluation framework is not well aligned to the breadth of 
government policy objectives in relation to major infrastructure projects.  While governments 
usually seek to get value of money in their (taxpayer-funded) infrastructure investments, 
governments also pursue strategic economic and social objectives such as regional economic 
development, or addressing high regional unemployment rates or other types of social disadvantage.   
To the extent that governments have these other policy objectives in mind, regional economic 
impact analysis and a ‘dashboard approach’ that takes into account non-financial wellbeing factors 
can be useful tools to inform project selection ex ante, or evaluate the benefits of public 
infrastructure projects ex post.   
Economic impact analysis (EIA) is a credible and widely used economic evaluation method, 
particularly for the purposes of identifying a projects’ impacts in terms of additional value-added 
(GRP, GSP, GDP) and jobs created.  Economic impact analysis measures ‘benefits’ in terms of our 
national accounting framework, which is based on the concept of value added to avoid double-
counting economic activity.  However, the weakness of this approach is that is does not necessarily 
tell us whether a project is a good idea or not, it just measures the projects impact.  It does not 
specifically account for the initial investment as a ‘cost’ as part of the evaluation framework and it 
does not generally compare projects (other than the BAU or ‘do nothing’ case).   
That said, EIA closely aligns with government policy objectives, such as economic growth and jobs 
growth.  An emerging trend in project evaluation techniques, particularly in the United Kingdom, is 
for a broader economic appraisal framework to be applied that includes so-called wider economic 
impacts.  This form of evaluation is, in our view, better suited to the consideration of public 
infrastructure projects with mixed policy objectives such as in relation to improving transport 
connectivity between the Illawarra and Sydney. 
The Australian Transport Assessment and Planning (ATAP) guidelines to an extent follow the lead 
set by the WebTAG framework used by the UK Department for Transport.  The WebTAG 
guidance, in addition to a CBA, includes a framework for the consideration of wider economic 
impacts (WEIs), and also recommends including an economic narrative with all project appraisals.   
Recent changes to the WEI Guidance in the UK support the application of a broader economic 
evaluation lens to projects such as the SWIRL.  The main changes to the 2016 WEI Guidance were: 
- A requirement for scheme promoters to produce a context-specific economic narrative, 
explaining how their investment will impact the economy and achieve the stated economic 
objectives. 
- Greater clarity on the relationship between the welfare appraisal (cost-benefit analysis) and 
economic metrics, such as GVA, GDP and employment. 
- A stronger focus on additionality and displacement in the analysis and reporting of economic 
impacts, to provide more clarity about the extent to which impacts are additional at the 
national level, or redistributed. 







- Greater flexibility to use new modelling and valuation approaches to supplement standard 
appraisal methods. 
- The integration of regeneration impacts into the assessment of wider economic impacts 
(regeneration impacts have, until now, been separately assessed). 
- More clarity about how the analysis of WEIs will be used to inform value for money 
assessments. 
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2.4 REPORT OUTLINE 
The remainder of our report is set out as follows: 
- Section 3 describes the characteristics of the South Coast Line in terms of capacity and 
passenger and freight demand.   
- Section 4 describes the main options for improving rail transport connectivity between 
Sydney and the Illawarra.   
- Section 5 presents our high-level cost benefit appraisal of each option.   
- Section 6 reports the results of our economic impact analysis of undertaking our preferred 
option on the Illawarra and Sydney economies.   
- Section 7 discusses potential funding options for the SWIRL.   
- Section 8 provides our key conclusions and recommendations. 
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3. Characteristics of Rail Transport in the Illawarra 
This section discusses the issues around rail transport in the Illawarra Region: 
- Section 3.1 provides an overview of the Illawarra Region; 
- Section 3.2 describes the South Coast Line which connects the region to Sydney; 
- Section 3.3 describes passenger demand for rail services in the region; 
- Section 3.4 describes the demand for freight rail services arising from the operations at Port 
Kembla; and 
- Section 3.5 describes the options for improving services on the Illawarra rail network. 
3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ILLAWARRA REGION 
The Illawarra region is geographically defined as the narrow strip of land between the Illawarra 
escarpment and the Pacific Ocean located between 40-200 km south of Sydney’s CBD and 
comprising the local government areas (LGAs) of Shellharbour, Wollongong, Kiama, Shoalhaven 
and Wingecarribee.  The population of the Illawarra is just over 300,000 (2017 estimate).  By train, 
Nowra in the south of the Illawarra is about 2¾ hours from Sydney and Waterfall in the north of the 
Illawarra is around 45 minutes from Sydney’s CBD.   
The region is the third most densely populated in NSW after Sydney and Newcastle.  In terms of 
transport infrastructure, the Illawarra region is supported by two main rail lines (being the South 
Coast Line and the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line), the Princes Highway, local motorways, and local 
roads.  The main airport used for passenger and freight is Sydney (domestic and international).  Port 
Kembla is a significant Australian seaport serving the Illawarra, Sydney and greater NSW.   
Because of its proximate location to Sydney, which is Australia’s largest and deepest labour market 
(comprising close to 4 million jobs), about 20,000 people commute daily between the Illawarra and 
Sydney to work, study or visit for leisure (2011 Census).  Most (about 15,000) travel from the 
Illawarra to Sydney.  We estimate that, in 2017, about 12,000 people travel by car and 3,000 by rail.   
The main rail line is the South Coast Line from Bondi Junction through Central Station to Port 
Kembla or Bomaderry station in Nowra, Shoalhaven.  This line has been recognised by the 
Australian Government as a key strategic passenger rail corridor (DIRD 2017, p.15).  The line is 
publicly owned through RailCorp, a NSW State Owned Corporation (SOC).  In recent years, the 
efficiency of the South Coast Line has been impacted by increased congestion with passenger and 
freight trains competing for scarce slots.  In addition, because of the physical topography of the 
Illawarra escarpment, significant improvements to the South Coast Line are likely to come at a very 
high cost.   
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) completed a study of Illawarra transport connectivity for Illawarra 
First in 2014.  PwC found: 
“Our assessment of the Illawarra’s connectivity reveals strengths and weaknesses.  While the 
region is served by a reasonably comprehensive road and rail network, the low speeds on those 
networks are a major weakness.  The scores for road user speed are consistently low across all 
external trip origins and destinations.  This has a significant negative impact on the economic 
productivity of the region given that private trips account for a large proportion of the transport 
task.  In particular, the connectivity performance between Sydney and Wollongong is mixed.  Road 
and rail network coverage is strong, with scores of 4 and 5, respectively.  Public transport speed 







and quality are average with scores between 3 and 4.  However, road user speed is particularly 
poor, with a score of 1.  The analysis also highlights a particular weakness in the Illawarra’s 
freight connectivity, particularly to Sydney’s west and south west.” (PwC 2014, p.iv, emphasis 
added). 
Table 3-1: PwC analysis of Illawarra transport connectivity 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the use of the line by both freight and passenger trains at Tempe Station, which is 
on the South Coast Line in the heart of the Sydney Trains Network.  The congestion affects 
reliability and often causes delays or cancellations.  Our modelling has shown that there a very few 
additional passenger or freight ‘slots’ available on the South Coast Line without significant (and in 
our view prohibitive) additional infrastructure investment, including expensive tunnelling.   







Figure 3-1: South Coast Line is shared by both passenger and freight trains 
 
Source:  NSW Freight and Ports Strategy (2013). 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF SOUTH COAST LINE 
Taken as a whole (from Bomaderry to Bondi Junction – approximately 160 kms), the South Coast 
Line currently includes 49 stops.  South of Wollongong, the track is predominately single line and 
diesel trains are used between Kiama and Bomaderry for both passenger and freight services.   The 
line is dual track north of Wollongong apart from the Clifton Tunnel (1km) between Scarborough 
and Coalcliff.  The stations covered by the South Coast Line include 18 stops between Bomaderry 
and Wollongong (including the spur line to Port Kembla), 17 stops between Wollongong and 
Waterfall, 9 stops between Waterfall and Central and 5 stops between Central to Bondi Junction.   
3.2.1 Getting from the Illawarra to different parts of Sydney 
The average peak hour commute times from Wollongong station to key stations in the Sydney 
Trains Network are as follows: 
- Wollongong-Central – 87 minutes 
- Wollongong-Parramatta – 118 minutes 
- Wollongong-Liverpool – 125 minutes 
- Wollongong-Leppington – 130 minutes 
- Wollongong-Campbelltown – 131 minutes 
Figure 3-2 shows the main stops on the South Coast Line.   







Figure 3-2: South Coast Line Network 
Source:  www.sydneytrains.info 
3.3 PASSENGER SUPPLY AND DEMAND ON THE SOUTH COAST LINE 
During weekdays, there are 28 passenger services travelling from the Illawarra to Sydney (with 27 
services from Sydney to the Illawarra).  The service covers roughly a 20-hour period from 2.30am 
to 12.30am.  Most of these services are ‘limited stop’ (8 stops at: North Wollongong, Thirroul, 
Helensburgh, Sutherland, Hurstville, Wolli Creek, Redfern and Central).  At best, the commute time 
between Wollongong station and Central station is 87 minutes, but the journey can take up to 104 
minutes.   







In addition to passenger trains, the South Coast Line services freight trains connecting Port Kembla 
to Sydney and regional NSW.  Currently, there are 116 freight paths on the South Coast line per 
week (weekdays), which means that there are about 23 freight paths per day on average.  Most of 
these paths are overnight, which do not impede existing passenger services.   
The South Coast Line passes through the Illawarra escarpment, which consists of moderate to steep 
slopes with many intermediate benches and cliff lines.  Several landslides and large rock falls have 
occurred in different locations throughout the escarpment and this obviously increases the risk of 
line closure.  In fact, the Grand Pacific Drive and Sea Cliff Bridge were constructed in 2005 to 
avoid the costs of dangerous rock falls that regularly closed Lawrence Hargrave Drive.   
Considering that, on average, 78 trips per day are made via the South Coast Line, (consisting of 28 
passenger trains from Wollongong to Central, 27 passenger trains from Central to Wollongong and 
23 freight trains), any closure of the line would have a significant impact on the regional economy, 
commuters and freight movements.   
SMART has estimated the cost of a 1 in 100 year failure of the South Coast Line.  We have 
assumed the cost of repairing the damaged portion of the line to be $1.5 billion.  Hence, the 
expected value of the capital cost in any single year is $15 million.  The NPV (at 7%) over 50 years 
is $207 million.  It is highly uncertain how long the South Coast Line would be closed but our 
central estimate is 3 months.  To be conservative in our modelling, we have not included an 
estimate of lost freight productivity and the welfare losses resulting from the disruption to 
passenger services.    
3.3.1 Passenger demand projections 
In terms of assessing the potential future demand profile of the South Coast Line, we analysed a 
number of data sources, as follows: 
- 2011 Census data on travel to work (being the most recent data available); 
- TfNSW Open Data Hub (includes Opal Card data); and 
- Discussions with TfNSW officials. 
The 2011 Census data indicates that 1,978 people travel from Wollongong to Sydney by train each 
day to work.  Around three-quarters of these commuters detrain in Sydney’s CBD, inner-south or 
Sutherland.  The remaining one-quarter of these commuters travel further into Sydney’s north and 
west.   
Only a very small number (114 commuters) travel by train from Sydney to Wollongong for work.  
Most of these commuters (56%) are travelling from Sydney’s western and south western suburbs, 
with about 30% travelling from Sydney’s inner-south and the Sutherland Shire.   
The population of the Illawarra increased from 272,703 in 2005 to 303,590 in 2016, 1.1% per year.  
This period corresponded to Australia’s mining boom when Australia had the highest rate of 
population growth in the OECD.  Looking ahead, it would be reasonable to assume that, based on 
‘sea change’ migratory patterns and historic growth rates, the future population growth in the 
Illawarra would be in the order of 1.1% per year.  However, according to the NSW Department of 
Planning & Environment (2016), the population of the Illawarra is projected to grow by just 0.89 
per cent per annum between 2016 and 2021, moderating to 0.81 per annum to 2026.   
Assuming 200 return trip commutes per person per annum, and applying the above annual 
population growth forecasts, the annual number of commute trips made by South Coast Line will 







increase from almost 840,000 in 2017 to between 902,000 (at 0.89%) and 917,000 (at 1.1%) in 
2025, depending on which population growth rate is applied.   
The population-based projections of passenger rail demand assume, among other things, that there 
is a direct relationship between forecast population growth and the demand for rail services, that 
there are no feedback effects (for instance, better train services may encourage more people to 
commute by train), and that existing work and commuting patterns continue to hold.  To illustrate 
the range of possible outcomes, we have therefore applied two sensitivities:  
- the first sensitivity assumes the demand for rail services grows at a lower rate, corresponding 
to half the population growth rate projected by the NSW Department of Planning & 
Environment; and 
- the second sensitivity takes account of the potential for high demand growth that the Opal 
data appears to suggest, and assumes the demand for rail services grows rapidly, 
corresponding to twice the population growth rate projected by the NSW Department of 
Planning & Environment. 
The results indicate if the population growth rate in the Illawarra is only half of what was projected, 
the annual number of commutes would increase to around 863,000 by 2025.  Population growth 
based on recent experience (of 1.1% growth per year) would increase the annual number of 
commutes to almost 970,000.  Figure 3-3 displays the results of the sensitivity analysis. 
Figure 3-3: Sensitivity Analysis: Forecast demand for the South Coast Line, by population 
growth assumption 
 
Source:  SMART forecast based on NSW Department of Planning & Environment (2016) and Opal Card data. 
3.3.2 Passenger travelling patterns 
The above analysis (based on the data from TfNSW Open Data Hub) illustrates projected demand 
for passenger travel on the entire South Coast Line.  To obtain a more detailed view of the demand 
for different segments of the line, especially Wollongong-Central, we used Opal card data provided 







by TfNSW for Monday, 28 March 2016, which was a typical weekday, not during a school holiday 
period and with normal weather.   
The data revealed that 25,741 people travelled between Bomaderry and Central.  We can categorise 
the demand of the line based on stations into three routes as follows: 
- Bomaderry-Coniston: The opal card data show that 1,815 people board the train at stations 
between Bomaderry and Coniston (inclusive).  We found that 26% of these people detrain 
within this segment, 45% travel further north and detrain between Wollongong and Waterfall, 
and 29% travel into the Sydney Trains Network, between Heathcote and Central Stations. 
- Wollongong-Waterfall: We found that 3,374 commuters start their journey from a station 
between Wollongong and Waterfall (inclusive).  Of these commuters, 40% detrain within this 
segment, while 47% commute through to the Sydney Trains Network and 13% travel south 
detraining between Coniston and Bomaderry stations.   
- Heathcote-Central: 20,552 of people travel from a station between Heathcote and Central 
from which 88% travelled to another station in the Sydney network, and only 9% and 3% 
respectively travelled south to Wollongong-Helensburgh and Bomaderry-Coniston 
respectively.   
We then excluded the number of commuters between Heathcote and Central (which is a part of 
Sydney Trains Network) in order to find the demand for the Illawarra segment.  This elimination 
decreases the demand of the segment to 7,591 trips per day from which 4,685 trips (equivalent to 
62 per cent) commute to/from Wollongong and Central.  Applying the central population growth 
projections referred to above and without any significant improvements to the current rail transport 
network, demand between Wollongong and Central is projected to increase from 4,685 trips per day 
in 2016 to 5,099 trips per day by 2025.   
Table 3-2 below summarises our demand forecasts for different line segments.   
Table 3-2: The Current and Future Demand of Passenger Train on the South Coast Line 
SEGMENT 
DEMAND (TRIPS PER DAY) 
2016 2021 2025 
Bomaderry-Central 25,741 26,912 28,018 
Southern Stations (Coniston-Bomaderry)  2,906 3,038 3,163 
Wollongong-Central 22,835 23,874 24,855 
Demand between Bomaderry and Central (Excluding Heathcote-Central) 7,591 7,936 8,263 
Demand between Wollongong and Central (Excluding Heathcote-
Central) 
4,685 4,898 5,099 
Source:  SMART forecasts based on Census (2011) and Opal Card data.   
 
3.4 FREIGHT DEMAND ON THE SOUTH COAST LINE 
Port Kembla is the most significant bulk goods port in southern NSW.  It accommodates NSW’s 
largest grain handling facility and is the second largest coal export port in NSW.  Port Kembla’s 
main dry bulk trades are grain, coal, coke, cement clinker, and steel making raw materials, but also 







include other dry bulk products include fertiliser, copper concentrate, soda ash and gypsum.  Dry 
bulk trade at Port Kembla is forecast to grow from 20.3 million tonnes in 2015 to 30 million tonnes 
per year by 2045. 
The Australian Infrastructure Audit 2015 identified that Port Kembla would face capacity 
constraints in the absence of any rail network improvements (Infrastructure Australia 2017).   
There are two freight lines in the Illawarra that connect Port Kembla to several markets in Sydney 
and in regional NSW: the South Coast Line and the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line, managed by the 
NSW Government and ARTC respectively.  Figure 3-4 shows the freight paths, rail and road, to or 
from Port Kembla.  Currently, 60-65% of freight moving to and from Port Kembla is transported by 
rail on either the South Coast Line or the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line.  As noted above, operations 
on both lines are impacted by passenger rail services in the region, resulting in disruptions to freight 
scheduling as passenger trains are given priority.  Growing train patronage on the Sydney rail 
network will reduce the number of ‘train paths’ available for freight rail.  The capacity of the 
network is also limited by geographical constraints in and out of the Illawarra which restrict train 
lengths, operating speeds and, in some cases, the type of cargo that can be transported by rail 
(Infrastructure Australia 2017). 







Figure 3-4: Port Kembla Rail Network 
 
Source:  NSW Ports (2015). 
The main type of freight moving to or from Port Kembla via South Coast Line is coal, but other 
types of bulk freight include grain, copper concentrates, limestone, kaolin and cement, plus import 
and export containers.  The movement of freight to or from Port Kembla by rail has a direct impact 
not only on the Illawarra, but also on the Sydney rail network given the volumes of grain and coal 
that transit through Sydney from western NSW.  Likewise, the domestic steel produced by 
BlueScope and the steel products imported to Port Kembla are mostly transported interstate and 
intrastate starting their journey on the South Coast Line. 
Based on the latest available data, the freight volume on the South Coast Line was 9,566 kilotonnes 
in 2011 and is estimated will double over the next 20 years (NSW Freight and Ports Strategy, 
2013).  However, it is expected there will be no spare capacity on the line from 2030 (based on 
ACIL Tasman's demand forecast).  In order to derive a detailed demand analysis and since coal is 
the main type of freight, we have categorised all freight on the line to two groups of coal, and other 







container freight, and overview the contribution of each of these two groups to total freight demand.  
Table 3-3 displays the estimation of the current and future demand of all types of freight and coal 
on the South Coast Line. 
Table 3-3: Estimated and Forecast of Freight Volumes (kilotonnes) on the South Coast Line 
FREIGHT DEMAND 2011 2031 2011-31 CHANGE 
Total Demand of the South Coast Line 9,566 19,602 104.91% 
Coal 14.3 31.33 119.09% 
Source: NSW Freight and Ports Strategy, 2013.   
As freight shares the South Coast Line with passenger trains, freight traffic is not allowed to use the 
line during the peak commuting hours.  Also, the rail line is basically set up for passenger trains, 
which makes it difficult to secure longer train paths for freight trains.  In addition to these 
limitations, the expected growth in the passenger demand and the introduction of the southern 
Sydney rapid trains project will provide further boundaries for freight, especially more difficulties 
for freight train paths availability.  Meeting the future demand of freight will require efficient 
solutions to manage these limitations.  Currently, there are two potential solutions, these include: 
upgrading the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line; and constructing the SWIRL.  Before providing the 
details of these two solutions, we briefly review the key characteristics of the freight demand on the 
South Coast Line.   
3.4.1 Coal  
About half of the freight volume on the South Coast Line is coal that mainly comes from mines 
near Lithgow and the Port Kembla hinterland.  Some of the Lithgow coal is used for power stations 
and the rest moves to Port Kembla on the Sydney freight network and the South Coast Line.  About 
half of the hinterland coal is exported through Port Kembla while the other half is sold to the steel, 
coke, cement and other industries.   
The relevant mines include Tahmoor and Appin/West Cliff (Bulli Seam), both near Maldon.  
Glencore had initially slated Tahmoor for closure in 2018, however given recent increases in coking 
coal prices, Tahmoor remains open and Glencore has announced that is it for sale.  The current 
nominal coal capacity of Port Kembla is around 17-18 million tonne per annum (Mtpa) while 
14.3 Mtpa of it is used.  The Port Kembla Coal Terminal is upgrading its capacity to 25.5 Mtpa.   
Congestion on the Illawarra and Sydney Trains Network (including the South Coast Line) and the 
limitation of train paths on the Sydney Trains Network available to coal services is an ongoing 
concern to this industry in NSW.  For example, there is only one path for coal freight trains to travel 
from the Western and Southern Coalfields to Port Kembla and that is the Sydney Trains Network.  
The limitation of coal freight could be addressed by moving coal freight to the SWIRL. 
3.4.2 Bulk goods and general cargo  
There are many other products transported to or from Port Kembla.  Port Kembla is the main port 
for motor vehicle imports in NSW (and Australia), the leading port for steel and is a main export 
port for minerals and grain.   
Currently, approximately 400,000 vehicles are imported through Port Kembla.  Volumes of vehicle 
imports are forecast to grow to between 540,000 and 850,000 vehicles per year by 2045.  These 
vehicles are transported by trucks to avoid the costs of double handling (to get cars to car yards in 







Sydney).  The end of car manufacturing in Australia in 2017 is expected to drive an increase in car 
imports through Port Kembla. 
Figure 3-5: Port Kembla - Motor vehicle forecast (financial years) 
 
Source: NSW Ports 2015. 
Grain exported via Port Kembla comes from regional NSW.  Currently, the grain export through 
Port Kembla is at around 1.0-1.5 Mtpa in a typical year, and is forecast to at least remain equivalent 
with the long-term historic yearly average of 1.3 million tonnes.  Grain is mostly transferred to Port 
Kembla through the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line.  Due to the port facilities and the convenience of 
the Moss Vale-Unanderra line the grain industry considers Port Kembla as an efficient grain 
exporting port.  In drought conditions, the export of grain is insignificant while in good years up to 
70% of the crop is exported, which is difficult for the existing rail line to handle, especially in peak 
months.  The regular domestic grain service is approximately 0.5 Mtpa of grain from Manildra, 
Narrandera and Gunnedah to Manildra’s starch plant at Bomaderry, which are moved by six 
services per week on the South Coast Line (ACIL Tasman, 2011). 
3.4.3 Port Kembla infrastructure and rail 
Responsibility for maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure at Port Kembla is shared between 
NSW Ports and the operators of the facilities.  Port Kembla has the right to develop a container and 
multi-purpose facility at Port Kembla’s Outer Harbour, which may include new wharves, berths and 
terminal facilities for NSW’s second container terminal.  Stage 1A of the development, which 
provides seven hectares of additional port land on which a cement grinding and storage facility was 
constructed and is largely completed, while the design of the new wharf structure which will adjoin 
this reclaimed land to the east is also being progressed.   
A container terminal facility capable of handling at least three million standard shipping containers 
(TEUs) with both road and rail access are essential for a viable facility.  Rail solutions to 
accommodate further freight rail demands include upgrades to the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line and 
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3.5 ILLAWARRA RAIL OPTIONS 
As noted above, very few additional passenger or freight ‘slots’ are available on the South Coast 
Line without significant additional infrastructure investment.  Two alternative rail options have 
been identified – the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line and the SWIRL. 
3.5.1 Moss Vale-Unanderra Line 
The Moss Vale-Unanderra Line connects Port Kembla to the Sydney Trains Network via Moss 
Vale (which is on the Main South Line) and Unanderra (near Port Kembla).  The line is used for 
bulk freight such as grain, limestone from southern New South Wales and coal from Tahmoor.  
Connecting Port Kembla to Sydney, the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line is an alternative to the South 
Coast line for freight.  Assuming no network delays and a clear path, the Moss Vale route takes 
75 minutes longer than the South Coast Line due to a longer distance to Sydney (the route is 
approximately 100 kilometres longer) and the steeper downhill gradient in the loaded direction 
which requires a slow descent.   
While the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line currently has spare capacity and can accommodate additional 
freight movements, the steep gradient of the line deters further upgrades to expand capacity.   
3.5.2 SWIRL 
In 2010, the Australian Government commissioned a feasibility study of a potential rail link 
between Maldon (south west of Sydney, on the Main South Line) and Dombarton (near Port 
Kembla, on the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line).  It was envisaged that the line would provide a more 
direct rail link between the port and south west Sydney and the coal mines in the Lithgow area.   
Originally, this rail line was considered during the construction of the Port Kembla coal loader in 
1979.  In October 1982, the project received concept approval from the NSW Government and 
construction was commenced during the mid-1980s.  The project was cancelled in 1988. 
As the activity and operations of Port Kembla have increased, it is clear that SWIRL could unlock 
further potential of the port of Port Kembla and maximise rail transport of bulk products.  The 
construction of the line would free up capacity for commuter needs on the South Coast Line, while 
providing a more direct rail connection to the Sydney metropolitan freight network.  The SWIRL is 
essential for the efficient movement of containers between Port Kembla and the growth areas of 
Western Sydney. 
3.6 SUMMING UP 
Passenger rail services between the Illawarra and the metropolitan hub of Sydney currently rely 
solely on the South Coast Line.  Commuting times between the Illawarra and Sydney are slow, 
constrained by the steep and winding journey through the Illawarra escarpment and the congestion 
on the Sydney Trains Network.  In recent years, the efficiency of the South Coast Line has also 
been impacted by increased congestion with passenger and freight trains competing for scarce slots.  
Given current freight projections out of Port Kembla, the demand for freight services is expected to 
double over the next 20 years (ACIL Tasman, 2011).  At the same time, the expected growth in 
passenger demand is expected to limit the scope for expanding freight services.   
Very few additional passenger or freight ‘slots’ are available on the South Coast Line without 
significant additional and very costly infrastructure investment.  The most promising alternative rail 
option identified is the SWIRL, discussed further in the following sections.   
 







4. Options to Improve Rail Connectivity 
Section 3 described the rail transport links in the Illawarra and identified important demographic, 
geographical, geotechnical and demand characteristics of the South Coast Line.  We found the 
adequacy of the line deteriorates quickly when modest growth in passenger and freight demand is 
projected.   
In this section, we consider several options to improve the performance of the South Coast Line 
and, more generally, improve rail connectivity between the Illawarra and Sydney: 
- Sections 4.1 through to 4.3 review various options to improve services on the South Coast 
Line; and 
- Section 4.4 considers the option of commissioning a new rail line to avoid the Illawarra 
escarpment and connect the Illawarra to Western Sydney, the fastest growing economy in 
Australia. 
The options outlined below have been informed by several discussions with key stakeholders.  We 
have undertaken extensive consultations and used detailed modelling, RailNet model (Appendix C) 
as well as financial and economic modelling (Appendix D) to develop proposed options and 
recommendations.   
4.1 OPTION 1 – INCREASE THE FREQUENCY OF PASSENGER TRAINS 
The first option we considered was adding passenger train slots into the current Sydney Trains 
timetable, without making any other changes.  In other words, we tested whether the South Coast 
Line is operating at full capacity under current conditions.   
Based on the latest available passenger and freight timetables, we found the number of additional 
slots that can reasonably be accommodated would be minimal, likely six additional slots between 
Wollongong and Central stations in the morning and two additional slots between Central and 
Wollongong stations in the afternoon.  Outside of peak hours, additional passenger slots were 
generally scarce, other than in the early hours of the morning when passenger demand would be 
close to zero.   
The potential benefit to commuters from the (modelled) additional passenger trains at peak times 
would be marginal.  These additional trains, like the current trains, would still take 87-104 minutes 
to travel between Wollongong and Central stations.  Therefore, the only benefit to passengers 
would relate to a marginal increase in train frequency, which would provide a reduced waiting time 
and slightly greater passenger convenience. 
We also considered increasing the frequency of passenger trains by introducing a high frequency 
shuttle service operating between Bomaderry and Wollongong and Wollongong and Waterfall, 
stopping at all stations.   
Under this configuration, we found six additional slots for shuttle services between Bomaderry and 
Wollongong Stations.  Of these, two additional services are in the morning peak (6am to 9am).  We 
found eight additional slots for shuttle services between Wollongong and Bomaderry stations.  Of 
these, three additional services are in the afternoon peak (4pm to 7pm).   
We found 24 additional slots for shuttle services between Wollongong and Waterfall stations.  Of 
these new services, seven additional services are in the morning peak.  We also found 25 additional 







slots for shuttle services between Waterfall and Wollongong stations.  Of these new services, nine 
additional services are in the afternoon peak.   
We also considered more 8-carriage train services to increase capacity on the South Coast Line.   
Although these options would not reduce the travel time between the Illawarra and Sydney, it 
would provide a benefit of increased reliability and convenience for rail commuters.  This, in turn, 
could provide a longer-run benefit as the increased frequency of services could lead to an increase 
in demand, which would justify more infrastructure investment on the South Coast Line.   
4.2 OPTION 2 – INCREASE THE SPEED OF PASSENGER TRAINS 
Our terms of reference focussed on improving the passenger commute time between the Illawarra 
and Sydney, which is currently, at best, 87 minutes between Wollongong and Central stations.  Our 
objective was to evaluate under what conditions it was possible to travel the 82 kilometres (by 
track) between Wollongong and Central stations in 60 minutes.   
To support faster trains, we considered the following indicative infrastructure works: 
- Additional duplication (beyond the current works) around Helensburgh to allow for an 
express service between Wollongong and Central Stations; 
- Line straightening (requiring tunnelling) between Coalcliff and Stanwell Park; and 
- Line straightening (requiring tunnelling) between Helensburgh and Waterfall. 
With these significant infrastructure upgrades, we found it may be possible to shorten the passenger 
commute time by, at most, some 15-20 minutes each way.  One factor to note is, without bypassing 
the Illawarra escarpment the steepness of the gradient remains an unavoidable constraint to 
increasing speeds.  Another limiting factor is almost half of the journey between the Illawarra and 
Sydney is on the congested Sydney Trains Network.  It would, therefore, require significant 
timetable or infrastructure modifications to the South Coast Line (between Waterfall and Central 
stations) to clear the line to allow for an express service to run on the line.   
In summary, we found, short of completely rebuilding the South Coast Line and severely 
interrupting the timetable on the Sydney Trains Network (to free up the South Coast Line), it is not 
possible to achieve the 60-minute passenger commute goal.   
4.3 OPTION 3 – INTRODUCE MORE ADVANCED SIGNALLING TECHNOLOGY 
Given the constraints around increasing the frequency and speed of passenger trains, we considered 
whether introducing more advanced signalling technology would enable trains to safely run closer 
together or faster.  This would, in theory, allow for faster commute times through the Sydney Trains 
Network but would be of less value on the South Coast Line.   
We examined the potential impacts of introducing the European Train Control System (ETCS) onto 
the South Coast Line (that is, from Bomaderry to Bondi Junction stations).  Obviously, the 
introduction of the ETCS onto the South Coast Line would be in conjunction with a more general 
rollout of the technology across the Sydney Trains Network.  We understand TfNSW is considering 
such a rollout although, as at the 2017-18 State Budget, no funding decision has been made.   
ETCS is a “signalling, control and train protection system” that designed to improve safety and 
reliability on Europe’s railways.  There are four different levels of ETCS, namely: Levels 0, 1, 2 
and 3 whereby each level is more technologically sophisticated.   







Level 0 relates to situations in which an ETCS-fitted vehicle is used on a non-ETCS route.  In this 
case, the train equipment monitors the speed of the train while the train driver checks the trackside 
signals.  Level 1 is a cab signalling system in which the cab system continuously displays the 
permitted speed and the line profile ahead to the driver.  The trackside signals are also collected by 
a system called “Eurobalise”, which reports the position of the train to rail track coordinators.   
The ETCS Level 2 (ETCS2) is a digital radio-based system where most of the signalling system is 
displayed in the drivers cabin.  A central coordinator monitors train movements in real time and 
provides ‘movement authority’ based on information about the location of other trains in the 
network, speed and route data.  The Eurobalises act as passive positioning beacons or "electronic 
milestones".  Between two positioning beacons, the train determines its position via sensors (axle 
transducers, accelerometer and radar).  The positioning beacons are used in this case as reference 
points for correcting distance measurement errors.   
A schematic of ETCS Level 2 is displayed in Figure 4-1 below. 
Figure 4-1: Schematic of ETCS Level 2 
 
Source: http://www.wikiwand.com/en/European_Train_Control_System#/Level_0 
With ETCS Level 3, fixed signalling is no longer required as train spacing is determined by the on 
board signalling system.  The train route is no longer cleared in fixed track sections but rather by 
ensuring headway between trains (in terms of time, not distance).  Level 3 is currently undergoing 
testing and further development.   
The Queensland Government has approved the introduction of ETCS Level 2 on the Brisbane rail 
network (for $600 million), which it expects will reduce the spacing between trains from an average 
of 3 minutes to 2½ minutes.  Specifically, the ETCS2 will be rolled out on the central part of the 
Brisbane rail network (between Milton and Northgate stations and covering all the stations in 
Brisbane’s CBD – Roma Street, Central and Fortitude Valley stations).  The CBA undertaken by 
Building Queensland (the equivalent body to INSW) found a strong benefit cost ratio (BCR) of 2.9.   







4.4 OPTION 4 – BUILD A NEW LINE TO BYPASS THE ILLAWARRA 
ESCARPMENT 
Given the binding constraints on the South Coast Line, we considered building an additional line to 
expand passenger and freight capacity, improve performance and reduce the potential costs of the 
South Coast Line failing (either by way of eventual geotechnical failure or reaching peak capacity).   
We reviewed expanding capacity on the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line but rejected that option based 
on limited potential expansion of freight capacity and the steep gradient of the line preventing 
certain types of heavy freight utilising the line.   
We also considered completing the SWIRL, which is already partially built (Figure 4-2).  The 
SWIRL is a more direct route into the industrial heartland of south west Sydney, including the 
proposed Sydney second airport at Badgerys Creek.  The SWIRL would provide a faster route for 
rail commuters to stations in western and south west Sydney such as Liverpool, Leppington and 
Campbelltown.   







Figure 4-2: SWIRL connection between Maldon and Dombarton 
 
Source: ACIL Tasman Feasibility Study (2011). 
There have been numerous studies looking at the potential benefits of the SWIRL.  The following 
are reasons generally given for why completion of the line would be desirable: 







- to accommodate potential increases in coal and other freight moving between Port Kembla 
and Sydney, and the Lithgow coal fields and Port Kembla (thus largely bypassing the Sydney 
Trains Network); 
- to augment the capacity of Port Botany by bringing more freight through Port Kembla;  
- to address increasing passenger and freight congestion on the South Coast Line by providing 
an alternative entry point into the Sydney Trains Network; 
- to enable upgrading of the South Coast Line to occur without relying on alternative transport 
options; 
- to connect the Illawarra with opportunities and services related to Sydney’s second airport at 
Badgerys Creek and the Moorebank intermodal terminal; 
- to reduce heavy truck traffic congestion on Mt Ousley and other roads near Port Kembla (by 
taking some freight off trucks); 
- to encouraging investment in the Illawarra to counter the impacts of the mining downturn and 
loss of the steelmaking industry; and  
- indirect benefits such as reduced noise and pollution in urban areas in Wollongong and 
southern Sydney.   
4.5 SUMMING UP  
We considered a number of alternative passenger and freight rail options to improve the 
connectivity for passenger and freight transport in the Illawarra region and metropolitan Sydney and 
beyond, respectively: 
- Option 1 – increasing the frequency of passenger trains on the South Coast Line – would offer 
only minimal improvements since the number of additional slots that can reasonably be 
accommodated would be small;  
- Option 2 – increasing the speed of passenger trains on the South Coast Line –requires a 
significant infrastructure investment to yield time savings of around 30-40 minutes for a 
return trip between Wollongong and Sydney Central stations;  
- Option 3 – introducing more advanced signalling technology on the South Coast Line – 
would offer improvements in safety, but only limited time savings; and 
- Option 4 – building a new line to bypass the Illawarra escarpment – is unlikely to be feasible 
for the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line, but is assessed as feasible for the SWIRL;  
 
  







5. Cost Benefit Appraisal 
In the previous section, we identified four options to improve rail transport connectivity between 
the Illawarra and Sydney.  The first three options related to improving the performance of the South 
Coast Line, while the fourth option considered completing the SWIRL.   
In this section we undertake two high-level cost benefit appraisals in relation to upgrading the South 
Coast Line and completing the SWIRL as both a passenger and freight service.   
5.1 OPTIONS CONSIDERED 
The South Coast Line upgrade (covering options 1-3 considered in the previous section) are 
summarised below. 
- Track straightening requiring tunnelling, estimated in this study to be up to 13 kms at various 
points between Scarborough and Waterfall stations1; 
- Introduction of the ETCS2 on the Sydney Trains Network, including the South Coast Line 
(here we estimate the incremental cost of the ETCS2 on the South Coast Line); 
- Timetable changes to allow for an express service to run between Wollongong and Central 
stations; and.   
- Track duplication improvements, although north of Wollongong station the South Coast Line 
is dual track apart from the Clifton Tunnel (1km); 
The expected benefits of the South Coast Line upgrade are as follows: 
- To reduce the passenger commute time by up to 20 minutes each way between Wollongong 
and Central stations; 
- Reduce freight commute times by up to 15 minutes each way between Wollongong and 
Central stations; 
- Improve road transport times as a result of fewer cars and trucks using the roads; and 
- Reduce car-related pollution, accidents and congestion. 
The SWIRL option (covering Option 4 in the previous section), involves completing the original 
Maldon-Dombarton rail line and making the line a predominantly dual passenger / freight track 
with electrification.  The SWIRL would provide a direct freight and passenger connection between 
Wollongong and south west Sydney.   
The expected benefits of completing the SWIRL are as follows: 
- Improved freight productivity; 
- Reduced passenger commute times between Wollongong and south west Sydney (estimated 
to be between 35-70 minutes); 
- Reduced road congestion between Wollongong and Sydney; 
                                                                
 
1 We note here that an ABC report on 7 June 2017 cited a NSW Government proposal for a 23 km rail tunnel between 
Thirroul and Waterfall stations costing $3.6 billion (or around $157 million per km).  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-
06-27/secret-rail-tunnel-from-wollongong-to-sydney-revealed/8653008 







- Expand the labour supply and demand in both regions; and 
- Increased jobs, education, business, trade, housing and tourism choices for both regions.   
5.2 METHODOLOGY 
A standard method for evaluating large public infrastructure projects is by undertaking a cost 
benefit appraisal (CBA).  A CBA involves the estimation of the economic costs and benefits of a 
particular project.  Economic costs and benefits are different from financial costs and benefits in the 
sense that economic measurements are broader and try to capture all of the costs and benefits of a 
project that would accrue to society as a whole, including the financial aspects.   
In terms of costs, while the financial costs of a project can be simply identified as the contract 
prices for construction and ongoing operation, economic costs are defined as the true ‘resource cost’ 
of the project and does not include the contractors margin for profit and risk, which is simply a 
transfer of economic surplus from the consumer (or taxpayer) to the contractor.  Further, costs not 
directly compensated such as noise and air pollution (during construction) or loss of environmental 
amenity, are also included as economic costs.   
In terms of benefits, financial benefits can be summarised as the future revenue stream from the 
project such as passenger and freight charges.  Economic benefits are broader and include benefits 
to society such as reduced commuting times, reduced transport costs, greater access to jobs, and 
avoided accidents and congestion.   
Generally, these economic costs and benefits accrue over a number of years and, therefore, it is 
important to analyse the net impacts (in dollar terms) using a common base year. 
Usually, a project is compared to a ‘do nothing’ or ‘business as usual’ case, and/or alternative 
projects.  It is important to keep in mind that a dollar spent on one project is a dollar that cannot be 
spent on another project; this is the concept of opportunity cost.   
The results of the analysis can be measured as a ratio of benefits to costs (BCR) or in dollar terms 
as a net benefit (or net cost).   
The breakeven point for the BCR is 1, in that a BCR between 0 and 1 represents a net cost, while a 
BCR above 1 represents a net benefit.  A positive dollar value (in net present value NPV terms) 
represents a benefit, while a negative dollar amount represents a cost.   
The NPV of benefits is the discounted value of the net benefit stream.  It is obtained by discounting 
the stream of net benefits back to its value in the chosen base period, in this case 2017-18.   
The general NPV formula can be represented by:  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = ∑ (t = 0 to n) 𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 / (1 + 𝑟)t , where:  
Bt is the benefits from project in period t, Ct is the expenditure on the project in period t, r is the 
economic discount rate (generally set at 7%), n is the number of years the benefits and costs from 
projects are accrued.   
The ROI calculates the net return on an investment, relative to the costs invested, and is expressed 
as a percentage.   
The general ROI formula is represented by:  
𝑅𝑂𝐼 = {[𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐵 – 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐶] / 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐶} 𝑥 100, where:  
NPVB is the NPV of the benefits and NPVC is the NPV of the costs. 







5.3 RESOURCE COSTS 
The economic costs of the South Coast Line upgrade and the SWIRL can be categorised as 
described in Table 5-1.  A comprehensive costing of the resource costs of either of these options 
would require a detailed engineering assessment, which is beyond the scope of this report.  The cost 
estimates described in the following sections have been derived from a number of sources, 
including discussions with industry experts, and are therefore indicative in nature, recognising that 
the costs of infrastructure projects tend to be highly bespoke and site-specific.   
An important point to note is that the definition of resource costs does not include contractors’ 
margins, which is simply a transfer of wealth from the consumer to the producer.  We use ACIL 
Tasman’s estimate of contractors’ margin of 10% in our assessment of both South Coast Line and 
SWIRL costs.   
Table 5-1: Categorisation of resource costs 
TYPE OF COST SOUTH COAST LINE SWIRL 
Infrastructure costs Rail line duplication 
Rail line straightening 
Additional train sets 
New signalling technology 
Labour  




Additional train sets 












Source: SMART analysis. 
5.3.1 South Coast Line upgrade 
5.3.1.1 COSTS 
SMART identified a number of infrastructure upgrades that could marginally improve passenger 
commute times between the Illawarra and Sydney.  These upgrades relate to line duplication (to 
reduce peak congestion), line straightening and signalling technology upgrades (to reduce commute 
times).   
Line straightening would require an estimated 13 kms of tunnelling work to be undertaken on the 
South Coast Line.  Rail tunnelling is generally considered to be an extremely expensive 
undertaking, as highlighted in the Productivity Commission’s 2014 inquiry into the cost drivers of 
infrastructure in Australia.  For instance, the Productivity Commission cites estimates of tunnelling 
costs for specific rail routes of:  
- $208.2 million per route-kilometre for the Epping-Chatswood Line;  
- $125.1 million per route-kilometre for the Sydney Airport Line; and  
- $136.2 million per route kilometre for the underground sections of the Perth-Mandurah Line.   







Taking the approximate mid-point of these estimates, we assume the cost of tunnelling for the 
South Coast Line to be $150 million per route-kilometre, or around $2 billion for 13 kms of 
tunnelling (range: $125 million to $200 million per route kilometre).   
The cost of duplicating rail tracks is variable.  To develop approximate cost estimates, we have 
again drawn on information from the Productivity Commission 2014 enquiry, an analysis by Martin 
(2012), as well as internal analysis undertaken by SMART for various Australian transport 
authorities (2016): 
- The Productivity Commission cites costs for duplicating existing railway tracks of around 
$60 million per route-kilometre for the Cronulla Line, and around $85 million per route-
kilometre for the Richmond Line;  
- Martin (2012) cites duplication costs for a number of rail projects ranging from $4.1 million 
per route-kilometre for the Ormeau – Coomera Line to $68.3 million per route-kilometre for 
the Quakers Hill – Schofields line; and  
- Two confidential case studies reviewed by SMART as part of its Infrastructure Cost Drivers 
Study (2016) indicate that, depending on the type of environment, the costs of track 
duplication may range between $10 million and $40 million per route-kilometre. 
On this basis, the cost of track duplication for the South Coast Line can be expected to lie between a 
lower range cost estimate of $5 million per duplicated route per kilometre and high range cost 
estimate of $85 million per duplicate route-kilometre.  Again, taking an approximate mid-point of 
these estimates provides a cost of $40 million in today’s dollars per route-kilometre.   
However, because of the limited benefit for track duplication between Wollongong and Waterfall 
stations, we have not pursued this option further.   
In addition, we have not pursued costing the introduction of the ETCS2 system onto the South 
Coast Line because, essentially, a rollout across the Sydney Trains Network would be required to 
reduce congestion on the South Coast Line between Waterfall and Central stations.   
Table 5-2 accordingly summarises our ‘best estimate’ of key cost components of upgrading the 
South Coast Line: 
- The central estimate of the costs of the necessary upgrades for the South Coast Line is around 
$1.95 billion, noting that –  
- On the basis of the range of outcomes observed in practice, these costs could range from 
$1.35 billion in the most optimistic case to $2.85 billion in a high-cost scenario.   







Table 5-2: Costs of infrastructure upgrades to South Coast Line 













TOTAL COST  
LOW / HIGH ESTIMATE 
Line straightening on South 
Coast Line (via tunnelling) 13 kilometres 
$150 million  
($125 / $200 million) 
$1.950 billion  $1.35 billion / $2.850 billion  
Total costs   $1.950 billion  $1.35 billion / $2.850 billion  
Source: Martin (2012), PC (2014) and SMART analysis. 
 
5.3.1.2 BENEFITS 
We modelled a number of expected benefits flowing from the South Coast Line upgrade.  The main 
private benefit is the predicted travel time savings for existing commuters and new commuters who 
switch from road transport to train transport.  Social benefits include reduced pollution, reduced 
accidents and congestion on the roads as car commuters switch to trains.   
In terms of assessing private benefits, we first analysed the value of saving up to 30 minutes in 
commuting time twice a day (i.e.  up to 60 minutes per day) for approximately 3,000 commuters 
who use the South Coast Line service.   
We estimated annual travel time savings to be just under $12 million based on assuming the 
opportunity cost of a working commuter’s time to be $16.65 per hour (which is essentially 50% of 
the average hourly wage rate in NSW in 2016-17).   
In our central case scenario, we assumed an additional 6,000 commuters would switch to the 
passenger train service from cars, saving 15 minutes in travel time each way.  This amounts to a 
further (just under) $12 million per year in private commuter travel time savings.  Moving cars off 
the road would result in improved travel times on roads as well as reduced externalities such as 
pollution, accidents and congestion.  We have estimated this impact to be $21 million per year.  
There would also be an improvement in freight efficiency, which we estimate to be $10 million per 
year in our central case estimate.  Our freight efficiency estimate aligns with previous detailed work 
undertaken by ACIL Tasman (2011).   
In total, we estimated an annual benefit of about $55 million, which translates to $732.9 million in 
NPV terms (at the standard 7% social discount rate over 50 years).  At a 4% discount rate, the total 
benefit is $1,181 million (50 years)2.   
As discussed above, we estimated total costs for materially upgrading the South Coast Line to 
reduce commuter times to be $2 billion, which is just over $1.543 billion in NPV terms (at 7%, over 
50 years) or $1,677 million (at 4% over 50 years).   
                                                                
 
2 While we apply the 7% discount rate to maintain comparability across projects, in our view in the post-GFC world a 
4% social discount rate is more applicable.  See Appendix E for more details. 







This cost figure of $1.5 billion (at 7%) is simply the discounted value of the estimated $1.95 billion 
South Coast Line infrastructure investment.  Because the investment is spread over four years, the 
discounted value in today’s dollars is less.  Also, in the CBA framework, we ignore the profit 
component of the investment as this represents a transfer between the consumer and producer of the 
infrastructure service.  We therefore discount the original estimate of $1.95 billion by 10%, 
($1.77 billion) which is the same approach used by ACIL Tasman in its study.   
At the standard 7% social discount rate, our central case BCR is 0.48, with a low case estimate of 
0.35 and a high case estimate of 0.63.  At a 4% discount rate, which in our view in more appropriate 
in this current post-GFC environment, our central case BCR is 0.69, with a range of 0.51 (low) and 
0.90 (high) (Table 5-3).   









Travel time savings (existing commuters) 11.988 11.988 11.988 
Travel time savings (new commuters) 5.994 11.988 17.982 
Reduced pollution/accidents/congestion 12.000 17.500 23.000 
Improved freight efficiency 9.500 12.475 17.500 
Total private and social benefits  
(Annual) 
39.482 53.951 70.470 
Total private and social benefits  
(NPV, 7%, 50 years) 
544.881 744.564 972.539 
Total private and social costs  
(NPV, 7%, 50 years) 
(Central estimate) 
1,542.893 1,542.893 1,542.893 
BCR (7%, 50 years) 0.35 0.48 0.63 
BCR (4%, 50 years) 0.51 0.69 0.90 
Source: SMART estimates of individual benefits are based on annual savings 
5.3.2 South West Illawarra Rail Link 
The 42 km electrified SWIRL would comprise a 35 km link between Maldon (near Picton in south 
west Sydney) on the Main South Line and Dombarton (at the foothills of the Illawarra plateau), 
located on the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line.  The 7 km distance from Dombarton to the south of 
Unanderra station, on the South Coast Line, would need to be electrified.  Based on the proposed 
Hyder engineering specifications, the line from Dombarton would track northwest and negotiate the 
Illawarra escarpment, climbing at a 1-in-30 gradient through a 4 km-long tunnel (ACIL Tasman, 
2011).  An electrified passenger service on this gradient (at 1:30 maximum or an angle of 3.3%) is 
feasible.    
With these additions, the SWIRL would be a predominantly dual track line except for the two major 
bridges and the 4 km tunnel where the line would be a single track as per the Hyder specifications.  
This would pose some constraint on capacity but this constraint would not be considered limiting in 
the short to medium-term in our view.   







The original estimate of the full resource costs (excluding a 10% allowance for profit margin as per 
the ACIL Tasman study) of completing the SWIRL, as a predominantly single track freight line 
(with two passing loops) had been estimated by ACIL Tasman at between $624 and $667 million in 
2011-12 dollars (Table 5-4), corresponding to $686.6 to $733.6 million in 2016-17 dollars. 
Table 5-4: Cost estimate SWIRL (AU$ 2011-12) 
DESCRIPTION COST ESTIMATES 
($ MILLIONS) 
Site infrastructure  $17.6 - $18.8 
Bridge crossings $53.5 - $57.2 
Tunnel construction & related costs $204.9 - $218.9 
Head hardened rail $9.5 - $10.1 
Earthworks and drainage $70.2 - $75.0 
Railway construction and minor works $42.9 - $45.8 
Railway electrical and signalling $10.7 - $11.4 
Sub-total $409.3 - $437.3 
Project indirect costs $145.0 - $154.9 
Total base estimate $554.3 - $592.2 
Risk contingency allowance $69.9 - $74.7 
Total risk-adjusted estimate $624.2 - $666.9 
Source: ACIL Tasman 2011.   
A more recent Infrastructure Australia study estimated the costs of completing the SWIRL as a 
freight line at $805.9 million in 2013-14 dollars (or $849.1 million in 2016-17 dollars3).  Of course, 
electrification of the entire route would be required to accommodate passenger trains. 
Martin (2012) offers two estimates for the cost of electrification of railway lines of $8.8 million per 
route-kilometre (Sydenham Line) and $12.6 million per route-kilometre (Craigieburn Line).  
Martin’s central estimate for the cost of electrification is $10.7 million per route-kilometre in 2012 
dollars, or around $11.8 million per route-kilometre in 2016-17 dollars.   
Table 5-5 summarises our ‘best estimate’ of the costs of the SWIRL: 
- The central estimate of the costs of the original Maldon-Dombarton freight line is 
$849.1 million. 
- The costs of making the line a dual track (except of the two main bridges and 4 km tunnel) 
with electrification and other modifications costs are estimated to be $840.0 million 
(essentially at $20 million per km on average over 42 kms of electrified track). 
- Adding these two cost components, our central estimate of total costs is $1,689.1 million 
(Table 5-5).   
                                                                
 
3 The measured average annual inflation rate between 2013-14 and 2016-17 was 1.8%.   







Table 5-5: SWIRL estimated costs 














Dombarton rail line (35 
kms) 
$686.6 to $733.6 
million  
$805.9 million $849.1 million  $764 million / $934 
million  
Complete SWIRL with 
additional line and dual 
track electrification.   
Electrification of Moss 
Vale-Unanderra Line 
from Dombarton to 
South Coast Line (42 
kms) 
  $840.0 million  $714 million / $966 
million  
Total costs   $1,689 million  $1,478 million / $1,900 
million  
Source: ACIL Tasman (2011), IA (2017) and SMART estimates.   
5.4 POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE SWIRL 
Given the limitations in scope of this report, the approach adopted has not been to undertake a 
comprehensive CBA.  Such an analysis would require a detailed engineering and 
economic/financial analysis of all aspects of the costs and benefits that would be incurred to assess 
the respective implications of either making incremental improvements to the South Coast Line or 
completing the SWIRL.   
Table 5-6 provides a generic overview of the types of benefits that can arise from rail investments 
or upgrades.  In the case of passenger transport, for instance, travellers will often value faster 
journey times, reduced wait times and improved reliability, which may in turn induce passengers to 
switch from road to rail (with attendant cost savings).  Improved travel times and reliability may 
lead to changes in the choice of residential or business location, which may in turn give rise to 
additional flow-on effects, for instance, in the form of higher regional growth.  Alternatively, 
improvements in freight connectivity may lower costs to businesses be an impetus for greater 
productivity and output.   
As is apparent from Table 5-6, identifying and (where possible) quantifying these benefits is a 
substantial and complex exercise requiring a detailed analysis of passenger movements and 
demographics.  Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this research report.  For the purpose of 
obtaining indicative estimates of the options considered in this report, we have therefore focused on 
a limited number of items where it is possible to derive approximate estimates of the types of 
benefits that could be expected.   











PASSENGERS DIRECT BENEFITS  
 Rail user cost savings Reduced waiting time penalties  
  Reduced travel time penalties  
  Reduced modal shift penalties  
  Reduced accessibility costs, where ‘accessibility’ is broadly defined as the 
variety of opportunities provided to people through efficient arrangement 
of land use and various modes of transport 
 Rail user benefits Improvements in service reliability due to reaching the destination in a 
consistent journey time 
Improved passenger comfort due to improvements in amenities 
 Benefits to the broader 
community 
Induced and generated rail trips: 
− Reduced car use / road congestion by shifting some car trips to 
public transport  
− Vehicle operating cost savings  
− Accident (crash) cost savings 
  Reduced environmental externalities 
 INDIRECT BENEFITS  
 Community development 
benefits 
Transport investment improves the accessibility for new and existing 
transport users in catchment areas, which is often translated into enhanced 
land values. 
 Low-income mobility 
benefits 
Availability of affordable transportation to low income people 
Budgetary savings arising from reduced social service outlays on home 
based health and welfare services such as home health care and 
unemployment benefits 
 Wider Economic Benefits Wider economic benefits arising from:  
− Agglomeration economies 
− Increased competition as a result of better transport 
− Increased output in imperfectly-competitive markets 
− Economic welfare benefits arising from improved labour supply 
FREIGHT 
TRAFFIC 
DIRECT BENEFITS  
 Improved productivity Reduced waiting time penalties  
Reduced travel time penalties  
Reduced modal shift penalties  
Improvements in service reliability 
Better coordination with attendant impact on inventories and spatial 
location with changing distribution network 
 Benefits to the broader 
community 
Induced and generated rail trips (as above): 
− Reduced car use / road congestion  
− Vehicle operating cost savings  










− Accident (crash) cost savings 
  Reduced environmental externalities 
 INDIRECT BENEFITS  
 Wider Economic Benefits Contribution to economic growth: 
− Reduced logistic costs that can be passed on to consumers 
thereby increasing product demand or increased production 
thereby lower product costs 
Wider economic benefits (as above):  
− Agglomeration economies 
− Increased competition as a result of better transport 
− Increased output in imperfectly-competitive markets  
− Environmental benefits 
Source: NSW Government 2013. 
5.5 SWIRL CBA 
As noted above, the benefits associated with rail projects and described in Table 5-6 are difficult to 
quantify, given that their estimation requires significant supporting analysis.  For the purposes of 
this report, SMART has therefore limited itself to some high-level observations and analysis. 
5.5.1 Benefits relating to rail freight services  
Infrastructure Australia (2017) has recently undertaken a cost-benefit appraisal of the SWIRL that 
focused exclusively on freight benefits and did not consider any wider economic benefits arising 
from the investment.  The proponents (the NSW Government) considered that the Maldon-
Dombarton rail link would address constraints in freight rail access to Port Kembla, and would 
provide a faster link between the main South Coast Line and Port Kembla.  Specifically, the aim of 
completing the SWIRL would be to: 
- meet capacity for rail freight to and from Port Kembla and the Illawarra region in the longer 
term and support economic development; 
- improve efficiency of the rail freight supply chain to and from Port Kembla by providing 
greater flexibility in train arrival and departure times, improved reliability, shorter cycle 
times, separation of freight and passenger services and support future intermodal movement; 
- maintain or reduce the level of safety risks to the rail network; 
- minimise impacts on the environment, surrounding land users, and the community; and 
- optimise overall rail network investment for the NSW freight task. 
5.5.2 Benefits relating to passenger services 
Table 5-6 indicates that one of the benefits of rail upgrades or investments for passengers arise from 
faster travel times, which reduce travel and wait costs, and which may in turn give rise to positive 
flow-on effects.  In the case of upgrades to the South Coast Line, SMART analysis and discussions 
with various experts indicate that commute times between Illawarra and Sydney may be improved, 
but significant reductions in travel times are limited owing primarily to topography.   







For the SWIRL, passengers using the line would be able to reach south west Sydney stations more 
quickly than using the South Coast Line, although Parramatta station would still be closer via the 
South Coast Line.  The minimum time difference to key stations in Western Sydney, assuming the 
passenger service travels at an average speed of 90 km/h on the Maldon-Dombarton sector, is 
estimated as follows: 
- Leppington station (29 minutes quicker by SWIRL) 
- Liverpool station (30 minutes quicker by SWIRL) 
- Campbelltown station (64 minutes quicker by SWIRL) 
The fastest journey from Wollongong to Parramatta via the South Coast Line (based on the current 
timetable) takes 114 minutes.   The estimated travel time via SWIRL, using the fastest time from 
Picton to Parramatta (based on the current timetable), is 123 minutes. 
For the purpose of assessing infrastructure projects, the NSW Government (2013) applies various 
‘value of travel’ time estimates that correspond to the opportunity cost that passengers on trains or 
buses attach to the time they are required to spend while travelling, whereby: 
- The value of private travel time is estimated at $15.14 per hour ($16.65 in 2016-17 dollars), 
and applies to private car occupants, on-board train time, on-board bus time, and other modes 
of transport; while 
- The value of business travel time is estimated at $48.45 per hour ($53.3 in 2016-17 dollars), 
and is applicable to all business travel. 
It is difficult to forecast the amount of ‘latent demand’ for passenger rail travel between the 
Illawarra and south west Sydney.  Nonetheless, SMART has constructed a high-level scenario 
where an additional 3,000 to 9,000 commuters use the SWIRL.  Based on this scenario, we estimate 
the travel time savings to be 30 minutes (on average) relative to alternative options of driving or 
taking the South Coast Line to Sydney and then the Bankstown Line to south west Sydney.  Based 
on these assumptions, we estimated a total private benefit of 70.5 million per year, or 
$939.5 million over the 50-year benefit period (being from 2021-22 to 2071-72) in NPV (2017-18) 
terms.   
The above estimates of travel time savings represent only one aspect of a range of different direct 
and indirect benefits that the SWIRL may deliver.  As indicated in Table 5-6, rail investments may 
deliver: 
- various rail user cost savings, including reduced travel time penalties (as estimated above), 
reduced waiting time and modal shift penalties, benefits from greater reliability and comfort, 
and more generally, reduced ‘accessibility costs’ that refer to the ease with which people are 
able to find and reach the best suited opportunity either for work, study or other activities; 
- various benefits to the broader community as a result of induced rail trips that arise because of 
reduced car use or road congestion and associated vehicle and crash cost savings;  
- specific benefits that accrue to lower-income households from improved access to affordable 
transport; and  
- a number of wider benefits that potentially translate into higher value added and economic 
growth, such as benefits from ‘agglomeration’ whereby the potential for scale and scope 
economies is harnessed, from greater competition, and from  improved labour supply. 







We undertook a high-level CBA that incorporated our estimates of passenger travel time savings, as 
well as estimates of freight travel time and operating cost savings, derived from the ACIL Tasman 
(2011) study.  We also estimated the benefit of avoiding a proportion of the costs of the South Coast 
Line failing in the event of geological disturbances.  In our central case, we found total private and 
social benefits of building the SWIRL to be $1,776 million and total private and social costs to be 
$1,572 million (NPV 7%, 50 years).  With estimated costs slightly above estimated benefits, our 
calculated Benefit Cost Ratio is 1.13 in the central case.   
About one-half of the total private and social benefits of the SWIRL are derived from passenger 
travel time savings, both by taking the SWIRL but also those remaining in cars which will drive on 
less congested roads.   









Freight travel time savings  111.786   124.207   136.627  
Freight operating cost savings  296.233   329.148   362.063  
Avoided externalities  169.294   188.104   206.915  
Option value of South Coast Line failure  186.310   207.011   227.712  
Passenger travel time savings and other 
benefits  835.223   928.025   1,020.828  
Total private and social benefits  
(NPV, 7%, 50 years) 
 1,598.846  1,776.495  1,954.145  
Total private and social costs  
(NPV 7%, 50 years) 
(Central estimate) 
1,572.097 1,572.097 1,572.097 
BCR (7%, 50 years) 1.02 1.13 1.24 
BCR (4%, 50 years) 1.40 1.56 1.71 
Source: SMART estimates. 
   
5.6 SUMMING UP 
In this section we have presented indicative estimates of the costs of infrastructure upgrades to the 
South Coast Line versus those of completing the SWIRL: 
- The costs of upgrades to the South Coast Line are estimated at around $2 billion, with a 
possible range from $1.4 billion to $2.9 billion.   
- The costs of completing the SWIRL are estimated at around $1.7 billion, with a possible 
range from around $1.5 billion to $1.9 billion.   
In relation to the SWIRL we found: 
- Under our central case assumption, the SWIRL achieves the BCR hurdle rate of 1.0.  At a 7% 
discount rate over a 50-year infrastructure asset life, the BCR ranges from 1.02 to 1.24 with 







our central case estimate being 1.13.  At a 4% discount rate, the BCR ranges from 1.40 to 
1.71 with our central case estimate being 1.56.   
- In addition, there are potentially significant additional and wider economic benefits for 
commuters and residents of the Illawarra and south west Sydney that have not been measured 
in this CBA.   
  







6. Regional Economic Impact of Option 4 
The results of the CBA reported in Section 4 indicate that completing the SWIRL is a better priority 
option than significantly upgrading the South Coast Line.  In this section, we report the results of 
the economic impact analysis of this option.   
This section is structured as follows: 
- Section 6.1 describes the concept of economic impact modelling;  
- Section 6.2 describes the economic variables we have modelled, including input assumptions 
and scenarios;  
- Section 6.4 shows the modelling results relating to economic growth and employment; and 
- Section 6.5 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis.   
6.1 WHAT IS ECONOMIC IMPACT MODELLING? 
As the name implies, economic impact modelling measures the effects across a defined region of 
some change to the normal (or equilibrium) structure of the economy.  This type modelling attempts 
to answer the question: what are the effects over time on economic output, employment and other 
economic parameters of investing or spending, say $1 billion, in the Illawarra.  Importantly, the 
effects are compared to a BAU or ‘base case’, which accounts for the normal trend growth of the 
economy (that is, growth in the population, economic output, employment and productivity).   
The economic impacts estimated in this report have been prepared using the Cadence Economics 
General Equilibrium Model (CEGEM) (see Appendix D).  CEGEM utilises, among other things, 
the ABS Australian National Accounts: Input Output Tables data to represent the Australian 
economy.   
For this assessment, we have developed a bespoke model of the Australian economy classified by 
the following regions:  
- Illawarra (generally defined as the LGAs of Shellharbour, Kiama, Wollongong, 
Wingecarribee, Shoalhaven4) 
- Sydney (Greater metropolitan Sydney) 
- Rest of NSW 
- Rest of Australia (RoA) 
- Rest of the World (RoW) 
6.2 WHAT HAVE WE MODELLED? 
We have modelled the economic impact over time of completing the SWIRL as a freight and 
electrified passenger service over 4 years at a cost of $1,689 million (the ‘central case’).   
                                                                
 
4 Technically, Shoalhaven and Wingecarribee are part of the ‘Rest of NSW’ and we then apportion that impact back to 
the Illawarra region.  The Illawarra region is classified in the economic impact analysis using the Federal Government 
classification, that is, Wollongong, Shellharbour and Kiama local government areas (LGAs). 







This significant infrastructure investment is expected to provide a stream of benefits to the Illawarra 
and Sydney communities by expanding the supply of passenger and freight transport services to the 
region.  The completion of the SWIRL is expected to increase overall network capacity and 
passenger and freight demand for rail services.  In other words, in our view there is unmet demand 
for rail services between the Illawarra and south west Sydney (discussed in Sections 2 and 4). 
6.3 MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
The following outlines the key assumptions underpinning the economic impact analysis modelling.   
6.3.1 Capital investment 
We have estimated that the cost of completing the SWIRL, as both a freight and passenger service 
is $1,689 million (in 2016-17 dollars).   
Our estimate is based on the most recent publicly available cost estimate, being the ‘Project 
Business Case Evaluation’ published by Infrastructure Australia.  This report estimated the total 
capital cost for completing the Maldon-Dombarton freight line to be $805.9 million (in 2013-14 
dollars), which is equivalent to $849.15 in 2016-17 dollars.   
Our study then considered the cost of a dual track passenger-freight line, which requires 
electrification and different specifications to the freight rail line, including related to the type of 
steel required and functional gradients.  Based on previous work undertaken by SMART as well as 
publicly available estimates (such as provided in the Productivity Commission’s 2014 Inquiry into 
Public Infrastructure), we have estimated the total additional cost to be $839.9 million.  Adding 
these two numbers together ($849.1 + $839.9 million) results in our central case cost estimate for 
the SWIRL of $1,689 million configured as an electrified passenger and diesel freight service.   
6.3.2 Transport industry efficiency 
In terms of the flow of economic impacts, we examined the current transport industry structure in 
the Illawarra and made a high-level assumption around the potential for improved freight 
productivity.   
We estimated the impact of a 1% improvement in freight productivity in the Illawarra as a result of 
the SWIRL (operating in conjunction with the South Coast Line and the existing road network).  
Our estimate of the size of the freight industry in the Illawarra is based on ABS National Accounts 
Input-Output tables and the NSW Ports report ‘Navigating the Future: NSW’s 30 Years Master 
Plan’ published by NSW Ports. 
We estimated the improvement of rail transport productivity industry in Illawarra to be 1%, 
equivalent to $20 million per year.  Although derived differently, this estimate lines up with the 
ACIL Tasman assumptions around improved freight productivity.   
6.3.3 Population 
Improving the connectivity between Wollongong and Sydney will provide incentives (such as 
greater access to jobs, education and leisure opportunities) for residents of Sydney or other parts of 
Australia to move to Wollongong.  We estimate that this improved connectivity will increase the 
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population growth rate from the current rate of 1.1% (based on the latest ABS regional population 
growth data) to 1.4%.  Considering the current population of 300,000 people (ABS, 2017) this will 
result in an increase of around 900 people per year.  Two primary reasons people move between 
regions are job opportunities and housing costs.  If people are able to find lower cost housing in the 
Illawarra and work in potentially higher wage jobs in Sydney, then we could expect the population 
growth rate to increase beyond its current annual average.   
6.3.4 Labour force 
We also assumed a lowering of the natural rate of unemployment in the Illawarra (proxied by the 
long-run average unemployment rate) of 1,000 workers.  In other words, the increased access to job 
opportunities is assumed to ‘pull’ 1,000 people into the labour force that would otherwise not be in 
the labour force.  This is a key assumption that is not including in the CBA (see section 4).  
Increasing the supply of labour stimulates economic activity as new workers enter the workforce at 
lower wage rates.   
6.3.5 Income repatriation 
Finally, based on existing workforce trends, we modelled an income repatriation effect whereby 
residents of the Illawarra work in Sydney and spend their income in the Illawarra region.  In our 
central case scenario, we assumed an additional 2,500 people travelled to Sydney to work at an 
average salary of $50,000 per year.  Again, this assumption is not included in the CBA.   
6.3.6 Summary of input assumptions 
Table 6-1 outlines our assumptions and scenarios across three cases – low, central and high.  For the 
low-case scenario we assumed the required capital investment would be 10% lower than the central 
case (at $1,520.1 million).  Similarly, for the high-case scenario we assumed the required capital 
investment would be 10% higher than the central case (at $1,857.9 million).   
In terms of the other impacts, we assumed slightly larger variances reflecting the greater difficulty 
in estimating these impacts.  For instance, the labour market effect is assumed to be 25% lower in 
the low-case (at 750 workers entering the Illawarra labour force) and 25% higher in the high-case 
(at 1,250 workers).  Similarly, we assume the construction and operation of SWIRL will improve 
the freight productivity as well as the transport industry in the Illawarra by $15 million in the low-
case and $25 million in the high case scenario.   







Table 6-1: Option 4 assumptions and scenarios 






Infrastructure capital investment     
Additional capital expenditure on the SWIRL (full resource 
cost including new train sets) 
$ million  1,520 1,689 1,858 
Transport Industry efficiency     




15 20 25 
Population and Labour Force     
Additional population growth in the Illawarra over 20 years, 





0.2% 0.3 % 0.4% 
Lower natural rate of unemployment in the Illawarra 
(additional people (FTEs) per year active in the Illawarra 
labour force) 
FTEs  750 1,000 1,250 
Income transfer to the Illawarra (from Sydney)     
Income repatriation in the Illawarra region (additional 2,500 
people * $50,000, central case)  
($ million 
per year 
100 125 150 
Source:  Cadence Economics and SMART.   







6.4 MODELLING RESULTS 
The results of the modelling analysis are discussed in the following. 
6.4.1 Gross Regional Product – Central Case 
Under the central case scenario (at the standard 7% discount rate), we estimate the NPV of the total 
economic impact of Option 4 to be $2,579 million in the Illawarra region.  The total economic 
impact for Greater Sydney is $97 million. The reason most of the impact occurs in the Illawarra is 
because most of the capital investment and the assumed stream of net benefits occurs in the 
Illawarra. Conceptually, the economic impact for NSW is the sum of the impacts for the Illawarra, 
Greater Sydney and the rest of NSW.  The total economic impact for NSW is $2,635 million in 
NPV terms. 
In terms of the impact on the Illawarra, 71% (or $1,833 million) occurs in Wollongong, while the 
share of Shellharbour and Kiama is approximately equal 15% and 14% respectively ($381 million 
in Shellharbour and $364 million in Kiama).6  Figure 6-1 illustrates the economic impacts in annual 
terms.  As the figure shows, the economic benefit is at a peak during the construction stage.   
                                                                
 
6 Technically, Shoalhaven and Wingecarribee are part of the ‘Rest of NSW’ and we then apportion that impact back to 
the Illawarra region.  The Illawarra region is classified in the economic impact analysis using the Federal Government 
classification, that is, Wollongong, Shellharbour and Kiama local government areas (LGAs). 











Source: Cadence Economics and SMART.   
6.4.2 Employment – Central Case 
In terms of employment impacts, we estimate that the average annual additional employment 
over the construction and operating period (2018-2037) is 1,119 FTEs in the Illawarra, 14 FTEs in 
Sydney (Figure 6-2) and 1,135 in NSW.   
Peak employment occurs in 2022, at 1,367 FTEs in the Illawarra and at 1,387 in NSW, and 
41 FTEs in Sydney in 2019.   







Figure 6-2: Central Case Scenario – annual employment impact, by calendar year (FTEs)  
 
 
Source: Cadence Economics and SMART.   
6.4.3 Summary of results 
The overall results of the Central Case scenario for Option 4 are summarised in Table 6-2 below.   
Table 6-2: Central Case Scenario – summary of economic impacts by region 
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON… 
OVER THE PERIOD 2018 TO 2037 
$ MILLIONS, 
REAL GRP 2016-17 






Illawarra Region 2,579 1,119 1,367 
Sydney Region 97 14 41 
NSW 2,635 1,135 1,387 
Source: Cadence Economics and SMART.   
6.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
We also undertook sensitivity analysis of the economic impacts.  To this end, we considered a low-
case and a high-case scenario in which the effects of SWIRL are higher or lower than those of our 
estimations in central-case.  The assumptions of those scenarios are explained in Section 5.3.5.  Our 
sensitivity analysis also includes studying the effect of a lower discount rate on our results by 
reducing the discount rate to 4%.   
Figure 6-3 (below) illustrates the range of economic impacts across the three scenarios modelled 
when the discount rate is 7%.   







Figure 6-3: Scenario analysis, GRP impact ($ million, NPV at 7% discount rate)  
 
 
Source: Cadence Economics and SMART.   
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 report the results of the sensitivity analysis.   
We estimate that when the discount rate is 7% the economic impact in the Illawarra region in terms 
of GRP ranges between $2.1-$3.0 billion (2016-17 dollars).  This range represents the net present 
value of the stream of impacts between 2017-18 and 2030-31 (Table 6-3).  Decreasing the discount 
rate to 4%, however, increases the economic impact by increasing the Illawarra GRP range to $2.9-
$4.1 billion (Table 6-4). 
Table 6-3: Sensitivity analysis – summary of economic impacts by region (GRP) when 
discount rate is 7% 
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON… 
OVER THE PERIOD 2018 TO 2037 
$ MILLIONS, 
REAL GRP 2016-17 DOLLARS (NPV, 7%) 
 LOW CASE CENTRAL CASE HIGH CASE 
Illawarra Region 2,135 2,579 3,021 
Sydney Region 79 97 115 
NSW 2,174 2,635 $3,094 
Source: Cadence Economics and SMART.   
 







Table 6-4: Sensitivity analysis – summary of economic impacts by region (GRP) when 
discount rate is 4% 
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON… 
OVER THE PERIOD 2018 TO 2037 
$ MILLIONS, 
REAL GRP 2016-17 DOLLARS (NPV, 4%) 
 LOW CASE CENTRAL CASE HIGH CASE 
Illawarra Region 2,802 3,401 3,997 
Sydney Region 101 126 151 
NSW 2,860 3,484 $4,105 
Source: Cadence Economics and SMART.   
We also estimate the employment impact in the Illawarra region in terms of FTEs ranges between 
834 and 1,403 permanent additional jobs (on average) over the period 2017-18 to 2036-37 (Table 
6-5).   
Table 6-5: Sensitivity analysis – summary of employment impacts by region (FTEs) 
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON… 
OVER THE PERIOD 2018 TO 2037 
EMPLOYMENT (FTES, AVERAGE) 
 LOW CASE CENTRAL CASE HIGH CASE 
Illawarra Region 834 1,119 1,403 
Sydney Region 11 14 17 
NSW 848 1,135 1,423 
Source: Cadence Economics and SMART.   
  







7. Funding Options 
This section reviews the funding options for the South Coast Line upgrade and the SWIRL: 
- Section 7.2 comments generally on the issues with funding public infrastructure; 
- Section 7.3 discusses the implications of taxpayer funding of public infrastructure; 
- Section 7.4 discusses public-private partnerships; and 
- Section 7.5 comments on value capture options.   
7.1 2017-18 FEDERAL BUDGET COMMITMENTS TO INFRASTRUCTURE 
In the 2017-18 Federal Budget, the Commonwealth Government has made a significant 
commitment to expand the productive capacity of the economy by investing $70 billion in transport 
infrastructure projects over the period to 2020-21.  The budget papers report this commitment as 
follows: 
“The Government is focusing on growing the economy to secure more and better paying jobs, by:  
- Increasing its total funding and financing commitments to transport infrastructure projects to 
over $70 billion from 2013-14 to 2020-21, including an equity investment of up to 
$5.3 billion in a new Commonwealth-owned company, WSA Co, to develop Western Sydney 
Airport and an additional $8.4 billion equity investment in the Australian Rail Track 
Corporation to deliver Melbourne to Brisbane Inland Rail;  
- Committing more than $533 million in new funding to infrastructure and community projects 
to improve the resilience, connectedness and adaptability of our regions, including a 
$472 million Regional Growth Fund.” 
A key part of this funding commitment is the $10 billion National Rail Program, which is designed 
to fund priority regional and urban rail investments, with funding to be provided over 10 years.  The 
Commonwealth Government also committed to contribute $20 million to the development of up to 
three business cases for infrastructure projects that will deliver faster rail connections between 
major cities and major regional centres. 
Finally, the Government is establishing the “Infrastructure and Project Financing Agency on 
1 July 2017 to assist in the identification, development and assessment of equity and debt financing 
options for investment in major infrastructure projects.” 
7.2 FUNDING PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
Funding large public infrastructure projects like public roads and rail lines is very difficult because 
the services provided are not usually priced at full cost, with the taxpayer picking up a large 
proportion of the cost.  Because of this, it is difficult to know where to invest the next (or marginal) 
dollar of taxpayer funds – there is little assistance from a (very weak) price signal to guide 
incremental investment.   
Public infrastructure networks like rail lines, roads and water grids share some interrelated 
economic characteristics, including geographical specificity, long economic lives, high fixed costs 
that once engaged, are largely sunk, and relatively low operating costs.  More frequently than not, 
they are local natural monopolies, and that – combined with their inherent reliance on public rights 
of way – brings them within the orbit of policy and regulation.   







The natural monopoly characteristics also make the timely and efficient provision of infrastructure 
services crucial.  That is simply because shortages and other inefficiencies are unlikely to prove as 
readily self-correcting as they would be in other areas: if bread is in short supply, price signals will 
soon enough attract resources into its production; not so for sewerage or roads.  Moreover, with few 
good substitutes for infrastructure inputs, poor provision can impose high costs: for example, 
inadequate transport links can force excessively dispersed production (thus causing the loss of 
economies of scale, scope and agglomeration), create local pockets of monopoly power, and reduce 
the efficiency with which labour markets match job seekers and employers.   
Yet securing timely and efficient supply of infrastructure services by non-market means is anything 
but easy: it involves all the challenges of central planning – not least, an accurate prediction of 
future demand without the benefit of the price signal guiding investment.   
In Australia, state governments are responsible for funding infrastructure but with significant 
financial support from the Commonwealth Government.  For instance, national highways are 
funded at a ratio of 80-20 because of the Commonwealth’s much higher capacity to raise funds 
from taxpayers.   
7.3 TAXPAYER FUNDING 
Many economists and public finance experts contend that the public sector should undertake all 
infrastructure projects that have a positive NPV when evaluated at the long-term bond rate (as 
opposed to the social discount rate or the actual ‘riskiness’ of the project under consideration) and 
should borrow to do so, presumably in a way that matches the maturity structure of its debt to the 
flow of net benefits over time.  This view can be problematic. 
That is because it confuses the headline bond rate with the cost of capital to taxpayers.  After all, if 
the public sector can borrow at a relatively low interest rate it is because it has coercive powers of 
taxation.  As a result, any sensible calculation of the effective cost to taxpayers of providing capital 
to the public sector must take account of the extent and exercise of those taxation powers.  For 
example, if the government issues debt to undertake projects that will require increases in taxation 
at times when incomes are relatively low (so the marginal utility of post-tax incomes is high) then 
the burden of debt financing will be greater than the headline bond rate suggests.   
It follows that it is only in the unusual case where the projects being financed involve pure public 
goods, yielding services whose net benefits are uncorrelated with the state of the economy that this 
prescription will hold.  In all other cases, projects should only be undertaken if they have a net 
present value evaluated using a discount rate that reflects systematic risk and hence is likely to be 
equal or close to the private sector cost of capital.   
7.4 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
The Productivity Commission (2014) defines public-private partnership (PPP) as a contract between 
the public and private sectors where a private party delivers infrastructure and associated services 
over the long term and where some private financing is involved.  PPPs may be delivered through a 
variety of models including where the private party designs, builds, finances and operates the 
infrastructure service, or designs, builds, finances, and maintains the service for a period before 
transferring it to government or owning it indefinitely.  PPPs may be government funded through 
contractual payments from government, directly funded through a user pays mechanism, or a 
combination of the two.  Other models are also used.   







While use of PPPs has grown over the last decade, the growth in the use of these types of 
arrangement has slowed, in part because of some notable commercial toll road failures and funding 
constraints associated with the global financial crisis.  An important factor to note is that while risks 
may be transferred to private partners, the cost of risk will be factored into the cost of finance.  The 
Productivity Commission (2014) has noted that the outcomes from PPP projects in Australia have 
been mixed, which is consistent with international project experience. 
Increasingly, key risks are being transferred to government under PPP delivery arrangements, most 
notably traffic demand risk (large Australian road projects have a notoriously poor record in traffic 
forecasting).  There is also anecdotal evidence that governments have reduced ability to adapt 
design to changing circumstances, both in construction and operation.  In terms of infrastructure 
maintenance, further, PPP arrangements can tie up significant public resources for maintaining 
discrete parts of the transport network, which are often maintained to a higher standard than the rest 
of the network.  Each of these issues, where they exist, can erode the value of PPPs. 
In this regard, the Commission notes that there are greater risks from PPP arrangements if there is 
poor project selection process, if complex contracts with the private sector are inadequately written, 
and/or if short-term considerations dominate decision-making.   
PPPs work best when government has considerable skill in contract negotiation and management, 
and where there is adequate competition for the projects.  They can also potentially provide a 
timelier source of finance for important infrastructure investments that might otherwise be 
constrained by public debt pressures — an issue which may become more pressing in Australia over 
the medium term. 
7.5 VALUE CAPTURE 
In the context of this study, value capture mechanisms harness part of the unearned windfall 
increase in land value arising from improvements in transport connectivity between the Illawarra 
and Sydney.  If designed correctly, these mechanisms can be an efficient component of financing 
transport projects, along with user charges and general revenues. 
However, value capture mechanisms need to be designed within the context of Australia’s already 
extensive federal, state and local taxes that are linked to property values or unimproved land values, 
including capital gains tax, stamp duty and council rates, and company tax on developer profits.  
Further, good value capture design relies on extensive experience and datasets that, in SMARTs 
view, are not yet available in Australia.   
Issues to consider when designing value capture (VC) mechanisms include:7 
- Forecasts of land value uplift could be misused to make poor projects appear more viable. 
- There is potential for double taxation of land value uplift, due to the interaction between VC 
and the federal, state and local tax systems. 
- VC should be levied on actual – rather than potential or forecast – value uplift delivered. 
                                                                
 
7 This section summarises SMART’s Value Capture submission to the Inquiry into Transport Connectivity by the 
House of Representative Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Transport & Cities Inquiry into Transport Connectivity 
by the House of Representative Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Transport & Cities  







- Route selection or train station locations should not be unduly influenced by the financing 
mechanism, such as availability of parcels of crown land.  Rather, route selection of public 
transport infrastructure should seek to maximise social welfare by addressing an identifiable 
need.   
- Imposing higher densities and financing costs on existing and future residents in one 
neighbourhood while not imposing VC on past value uplifts or not every value uplift, could 
lead to inter-temporal and geo-spatial inequity. 
- Impact on overall level of debt and taxation, and government credit ratings. 
- Recent experience in relation to implementing taxes on windfall profits (such as mining 
profits), demonstrate the complexity in defining windfalls and implementing such taxes. 
- Unimproved land valuations for rating purposes may not be well-suited to the measurement 
and implementation of VC mechanisms. 
- VC should not be used as a second-best mechanism for recovering a sub-optimal pricing of 
public transport fares. 
- Land value uplift due to a rezoning should not be confused with (or combined with, or 
attributed to) land value uplift from new transport infrastructure unless the two are truly 
inseparable. 
- VC should be levied on true additionality rather than a redistribution of economic activity. 
- When drawing lessons from overseas experience policymakers should be cognisant of our 
different circumstances, including Australia’s system of federal financial relations, our 
relatively low population density, and relatively high reliance on income taxation. 
7.6 SUMMING UP 
There are a number of avenues available to fund the SWIRL.   
The results of the CBA indicate that the SWIRL will realise positive economic benefits towards the 
end of the 2020s assuming solid demand growth for freight and healthy passenger demand.    
Completing the SWIRL could address many of the demographic and economic issues facing the 
Illawarra and south west Sydney.   
Utilising a combination of funding from the Australian Government through the $10 billion 
National Rail Program as well as the NSW Government (including from the Illawarra Infrastructure 
Fund) as well as appropriate freight and passenger rail cost recovery mechanisms should make the 
project affordable and the benefits realisable within the next decade. 







7.7 SUMMING UP 
An economic impact analysis of the SWIRL suggests that the regional economic benefits associated 
with this investment are potentially substantial, as follows:  
- a $2.6 billion increase in the Gross Regional Product of the Illawarra, which translates into a 
$1.84 benefit to the Illawarra region for each dollar invested in SWIRL; 
- a permanent increase of over 1,100 jobs in the Illawarra; 
- a significant reduction in the risk of congestion or failure of rail connectivity between the 
Illawarra and Sydney; 
- potential to reduce congestion on existing road network and improve linkages between 
employment generating centres.; 
- a permanent reduction in the natural rate of unemployment in the Illawarra; 
- improved access to education choices for both south west Sydney and Illawarra residents; and 
- improved access to leisure choices for both south west Sydney and Illawarra residents. 
 
  







8. Conclusions and Recommendations  
The Illawarra Business Chamber (Illawarra First) commissioned the SMART Infrastructure Facility 
UOW (SMART) to investigate options to improve the speed and reliability of passenger and freight 
rail transport services between the Illawarra Region and the Sydney metropolitan area.   
Passengers travelling by rail between the Illawarra and Sydney using the existing South Coast Line 
currently face a lengthy commute of, at best, 87 minutes each way.  A 3-hour daily commute places 
a significant burden on rail commuters, and appears to force commuters into their cars, which in 
turn places a greater burden on the Illawarra-Sydney road network.  The fact that passenger trains 
receive priority on the South Coast Line also places limitations on volumes of freight that can be 
transferred by rail into and out of Port Kembla.   
SMART has found that reducing passenger commute times on the South Coast Line is severely 
constrained by the geological conditions of the Illawarra escarpment and the consequent 
engineering challenges, and would require a significant public investment in the order of $2 billion.   
Given these issues, SMART investigated the potential for an additional passenger and freight line 
between the Illawarra and Sydney, by completing the 35 km Maldon-Dombarton rail line, which 
was partially built in the mid-1980s, and adding a predominantly dual track electrified passenger 
and freight line with a 7 km link along the Moss Vale-Unanderra Line connecting to the South 
Coast Line south of Unanderra station.  We estimate the cost of building the 42 km SWIRL would 
be around $1.7 billion which is less than the cost of tunnelling through the Illawarra escarpment to 
get material improvements in efficiency on the South Coast Line.   
Completing the SWIRL could provide many economic and social benefits and is worth serious 
consideration.  For instance, the SWIRL and the South Coast Line operating together would 
increase total passenger and freight rail network capacity and open up jobs, export/import, 
education, leisure and housing opportunities for both regions.  A new line could also limit the cost 
of congestion, short-term closures or a catastrophic geological failure on the South Coast Line.   
SMART has estimated the economic impact on the Illawarra region of a suite of infrastructure 
measures aimed at significantly improving rail transport connectivity between the Illawarra and 
Sydney to be $2.6 billion (in NPV terms) and over 1,100 permanent additional jobs (in FTE terms). 
SMART recommends that:  
- The NSW Government should make a submission under the National Regional Partnership 
Program to secure funding to develop a detailed business case for the construction of the 
SWIRL and the upgrade of the South Coast Line.   
- Infrastructure Australia and the Australian Government prioritise their consideration of the 
SWIRL given the significant potential economic benefits on offer and relatively lower cost 
against alternative options to improve rail transport connectivity in the Illawarra.   
- In addition to constructing the SWIRL, TfNSW, Infrastructure Australia and the Australian 
Government consider (and makes financial allocation for) further cost-effective incremental 
infrastructure improvements to the South Coast Line.   
- TfNSW fast track the rollout of the ETCS2 onto the Sydney Trains Network, which should 
improve the efficiency, safety and reliability of the South Coast Line.   
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Appendix A Terms of Reference 
Request for Proposal  
Project title  
Directed Research: Identification of measures to improve speed and reliability of rail transport 
connectivity between the Illawarra and Sydney  
Background  
Illawarra First is focused on advancing economic development, business growth and long-term 
employment opportunities across the Illawarra region.  The Illawarra First members are a select 
group of leading organisations sharing a commitment to driving development and prosperity of the 
Illawarra by identifying and championing initiatives such as improved transport.   
Issue overview  
The region is serviced by the South Coast Line which runs suburban services from Bondi Junction, 
though Central station to Wollongong (including a spur line to Port Kembla) with the line 
terminating at Bomaderry.   
Between Thirroul and Waterfall the South Coast Line follows the escarpment, which is a steep and 
winding route.  This, in addition to the single track along some parts, results in slow train speeds, 
which contribute to an average speed of 50km/hr.   
The Illawarra escarpment limits the number and directness of east-west transport connectivity to 
three main road connections to the Southern Highlands and south west Sydney (Picton Road, Appin 
Road and the Illawarra Highway).  Similarly, east-west rail connections are limited to the highly 
indirect dedicated freight line to Moss Vale. 
Commuter and freight rail movements 
Around 15% of the Illawarra’s working population commute outside of the region for work 
purposes.  These commuters travel distances of between 50km (to the Sutherland Shire and Sydney 
Outer South West, eg Campbelltown) and 100km (to Sydney CBD) to reach their work destination. 
Improved passenger and freight rail connectivity between the Illawarra, Sydney and West/ South 
West Sydney would deliver economic and social benefit to all of the above regions.  Enhanced rail 
infrastructure could boost productivity, reduce freight costs and travel times, improve safety and 
reduce congestion on some of Australia’s most congested roads. 
High public transport journey times, particularly for rail, impact negatively on the productivity of 
commuters who travel between the Illawarra and Sydney for employment.  The focus on west and 
south west Sydney for both the state and federal government presents a new opportunity in the form 
of providing a solution that benefits the Illawarra. 
Challenges and Opportunities 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in their report, Linking The Illawarra: Improving the regions 
transport connectivity, assess the key impediments and challenges faced in respect to rail transport 
between the Illawarra and Sydney.  The report includes a benchmarking exercise and highlights that 
the Illawarra’s connectivity is around 25% worse than regional peers. 







Estimates provided in this report identify the cost of moving passengers and freight between the 
Illawarra and Sydney are in the order of $550 million per annum and that addressing existing 
bottlenecks and increasing travel times by both road and rail could reduce this cost by some $400 
million per annum. 
 
 
Project Purpose  
The Directed Research Report will be used to inform and support advocacy content and supporting 
strategies for Illawarra First.  The report should be developed for a generic audience and cite 
relevant engineering specifications on an as-required basis.  All material referred to during the 
research should be provided to Illawarra First.   
The Report should provide detailed referencing to supporting evidence and should provide clear 
recommendations capable of influencing policy debate at senior government and business levels 
and support community engagement and consultation.   
The Report should allow for the potential of either government or a combination of Private Public 
Partnerships to achieve outcome(s) and provide recommendations on how the proposed investment 
may be fast tracked.   
The final report should cite, as necessary, quality research and evidence to support findings and 
observations and provide clear and concise recommendations. 
 
 









Respondents are asked to provide a proposal, including a suggested report framework for an 
Illawarra First Directed Research Report assessing the potential benefits from improved rail 
infrastructure between the Illawarra and Sydney.  This proposal will form the basis of discussions 
between the proponent and Illawarra First about best ways to present the information to clearly 
demonstrate the return on investment for each recommendation.   
 
The aim of the Report is to provide evidence-based policy solutions to influence political decision-
makers and other opinion-makers to bring forward rail investments that will improve commuter and 
freight movements between the Illawarra and Sydney.  It is the intention that this research be used 
to advocate for a 60 minute commute between Illawarra and Sydney.   
 
Research should include, but not be limited to:  
- Identification of measures and (if possible) gross order cost(s) associated with a projects 
including information about the NSW/Australian Government’s current commitments, total 
costs, timing, delivery method etc.   
- Identification of infrastructure required to support high speed turnouts to reduce travel times 
and improve reliability of service.   
- Value and details of investment required to improve freight rail access to Port Kembla.   
- Future value and importance of the existing rail corridor following recommended 
upgrades/investment.   
- Identification of the potential value to the NSW economy and relevant sectors (e.g.  tourism, 
advanced manufacturing, education and health) of the delivery of the identified rail 
improvement measures.   
- The associated benefits of improved rail transport against relevant criteria including the 
Illawarra First Project Prioritisation and Assessment Criteria provided in Attachment A.   
- Potential costs associated with not investing in identified rail infrastructure.  These costs may 
include foregone revenue, investment, employment or costs associated with reduced safety.   
- Potential impact on key social indicators such as potential to support improved outcomes in 
social policy, e.g.  housing affordability, employment creation, improved safety and general 
economic development.   
- Identification of better approaches to identification and financing of such projects that might 
be pursued and advocated.   
- How long-term investment plans for NSW rail may impact the future use and operation of the 
rail corridor between the Illawarra and Sydney for both commuter and freight movements.   
- Provision of key messaging to be used in public advocacy and media messaging.  It is 
expected that this research would include contacting key stakeholders to discuss relevant 
issues and information. 
 







Appendix B Stakeholder Consultation Summary 
SMART consulted several key stakeholders over the course of this project.  We hosted two 
workshops to discuss options to improve transport connectivity (2 February 2017) and present our 
initial findings (8 June 2017).  In the interim, information was sought from a number of sources 
including NSW Ports and Transport for NSW. 
The workshop attendee list included: 
- Illawarra First members 
- NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet 
- NSW Ports 
- Port Authority of NSW 
- SMART Infrastructure Facility academic staff 
- Transport for NSW 
 







Appendix C SMART’s RailNet Model 
RailNet is a simulation-modelling platform for rail networks developed by the SMART 
Infrastructure Facility.  It is formulated to describe rail movements within a network, in this case 
within the boundaries of the NSW RailCorp and ARTC rail network.  The RailNet model maps the 
rail network components, for instance track sections, nodes and passing loops.  The model also 
accounts for the attributes of the network such as speed limits, gradient, directionality, distances, 
etc.   
The RailNet model runs in mathematical software called MATLAB8, where we upload the current 
network passenger and freight timetables and the various other ‘constraints’ on the network.  
RailNet is then used to simulate alternative timetables based on finding new available slots, 
changing speeds or other parameters (such as direction).  The model can also be used to simulate 
the addition of new infrastructure, such as passing loops.   
The model features a user-friendly graphical interface to perform operating/management tasks such 
as planning train paths, or viewing network statistics and performance.   




As the figure above describes, the modeller is required to provide information including the 
operating train timetable, train network, trip to be planned, earliest departure time, minimum trip 
time, arrival time window and train length.   
                                                                
 
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MATLAB 







The model then optimises the schedule of train paths (that is, in order to maximise the number or 
passengers or amount of freight moved along the network).  The model can be used for both 
passenger and freight trains or in combination.   
 
  







Appendix D Cadence Economics CEGEM Model 
The SMART Infrastructure Facility has a commercial arrangement with Cadence Economics Pty 
Ltd to use its computable general equilibrium modelling software and database.   
 
CEGEM is a multi-commodity, multi-region, dynamic model of the world economy.  Like all 
economic models, CEGEM is a based on a range of assumptions, parameters and data that 
constitute an approximation to the working structure of an economy.  Its construction has drawn on 
the key features of other economic models such as the global economic framework underpinning 
models such as GTAP and GTEM, with state and regional modelling frameworks such as Monash-
MMRF and TERM.   
KEY ASSUMPTIONS IN CEGEM 
Labour, capital, land and a natural resource comprise the four factors of production.  On a year-by-
year basis, capital and labour are mobile between sectors, while land is mobile across agriculture.  
The natural resource is specific to mining and is not mobile.  A representative household in each 
region owns all factors of production.  This representative household receives all factor payments, 
tax revenue and interregional transfers.  The household also determines the allocation of income 
between household consumption, government consumption and savings.   
 
Capital in each region of the model accumulates by investment less depreciation in each period.  
Capital is mobile internationally in CEGEM where global investment equals global savings.  Global 
savings are made available to invest across regions.  Rates of return can differ to reflect region 
specific differences in risk premiums. 
 
The model assumes labour markets operate whereby employment and wages adjust in each year so 
that, for example, in the case of an increase in the demand for labour, the real wage rate increases in 
proportion to the increase in employment from its base case forecast level.   
 
CEGEM determines regional supplies and demands of commodities through optimising behaviour 
of agents in perfectly competitive markets using constant returns to scale technologies.  Under these 
assumptions, prices are set to cover costs and firms earn zero pure profits, with all returns paid to 
primary factors.  This implies that changes in output prices are determined by changes in input 
prices of materials and primary factors.   
  







Appendix E Discount Rate 
Estimating economic impacts across time periods can be problematic.  For instance, aggregating the 
sum of economic impacts over, say, a decade in the future, can lead to an overestimation of impacts 
because, in very simple terms, “a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow”.  We therefore 
discount future economic impacts in current dollar values so that we can then aggregate the dollar 
values of impacts into a single figure.   
The question is, what is the appropriate discount rate to use? In general, there have been two 
approaches to selecting discount rates, namely: 
- a ‘descriptive’ approach based on the opportunity cost of drawing funds from the private 
sector; and  
- a ‘prescriptive’ approach that derives from ethical views about intergenerational equity. 
When considering private sector infrastructure projects, the weight of argument favours choosing 
the descriptive approach to determining the discount rate.  In practice, this means discounting future 
economic impacts at the ‘opportunity cost of funds’, which is reflected in the market interest rate.  
Harrison (2010) argues that: 
“The efficiency-based approach to the social discount rate, which dates back at least to Harberger 
(1969), boils down to determining the opportunity cost of capital used in the project: what benefits 
to society would the funds have returned if left in the private sector.  This ‘opportunity cost’ is the 
appropriate discount rate to determine a project’s capital value.” (p.16) 
In order to be consistent with standard practice in Australia, we use a ‘social discount rate’ of 7% 
when calculating the ‘net present value’ of the economic impacts, which follows the 
Commonwealth Government guidelines as described in the Best Practice Regulation Handbook, 
Office of Best Practice Regulation (2007)9.  It is arguable that this rate is a little high in the post-
GFC world.  For comparative purposes, we also estimate economic impacts using low (4%) and 
high (10%) discount rates and report results for 4% being, in our view, the more appropriate rate in 
the post-GFC environment. 
 
                                                                
 
9 http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/COAG_best_practice_guide_2007.pdf  
